|
Articles of Impeachment Against Cheney
US House
Congressman Kucinich
April 24, 2007
110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION H. RES.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. KUCINICH submitted the following resolution;
House Resolution 333
RESOLUTION
Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United
States, for high crimes and misdemeanors.
Resolved, That Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of 1
the United States, is impeached for high crimes and mis- 2
demeanors, and that the following articles of impeachment 3
be exhibited to the United States Senate: 4
Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of 5
Representatives of the United States of America in the 6
name of itself and of the people of the United States of 7
America, against Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the 8
United States of America, in maintenance and support of 1
its impeachment against him for high crimes and mis- 2
demeanors. 3
Article I
In his conduct while Vice President of the United 5
States, Richard B. Cheney, in violation of his constitu- 6
tional oath to faithfully execute the office of Vice Presi- 7
dent of the United States and, to the best of his ability, 8
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 9
United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty 10
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has pur- 11
posely manipulated the intelligence process to deceive the 12
citizens and Congress of the United States by fabricating 13
a threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to justify 14
the use of the United States Armed Forces against the 15
nation of Iraq in a manner damaging to our national secu- 16
rity interests, to wit: 17
- (1) Despite all evidence to the contrary, the 18
Vice President actively and systematically sought to 19
deceive the citizens and Congress of the United 20
States about an alleged threat of Iraqi weapons of 21
mass destruction: 22
-
- (A) "We know they have biological and 23
chemical weapons." March 17, 2002, Press 24
Conference by Vice President Dick Cheney and 25
His Highness Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, 1
Crown Prince of Bahrain at Shaikh Hamad 2
Palace. 3
- (B) "...and we know they are pursuing nu- 4
clear weapons." March 19, 2002, Press Brief- 5
ing by Vice President Dick Cheney and Israeli 6
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Jerusalem. 7
- (C) "And he is actively pursuing nuclear 8
weapons at this time..." March 24, 2002, CNN 9
Late Edition interview with Vice President Che- 10
ney. 11
- (D) "We know he's got chemicals and bio- 12
logical and we know he's working on nuclear." 13
May 19, 2002, NBC Meet the Press interview 14
with Vice President Cheney. 15
- (E) "But we now know that Saddam has 16
resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weap- 17
ons... Simply stated, there is no doubt that Sad- 18
dam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruc- 19
tion. There is no doubt that he is amassing 20
them to use against our friends, against our al- 21
lies, and against us." August 26, 2002, Speech 22
of Vice President Cheney at VFW 103rd Na- 23
tional Convention. 24
- (F) "Based on intelligence that's becoming 1
available, some of it has been made public, 2
more of it hopefully will be, that he has indeed 3
stepped up his capacity to produce and deliver 4
biological weapons, that he has reconstituted 5
his nuclear program to develop a nuclear weap- 6
on, that there are efforts under way inside Iraq 7
to significantly expand his capability." Sep- 8
tember 8, 2002 NBC Meet the Press interview 9
with Vice President Cheney. 10
- (G) "He is, in fact, actively and aggres- 11
sively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons." 12
September 8, 2002 NBC Meet the Press inter- 13
view with Vice President Cheney. 14
- (H) "And we believe he has, in fact, recon- 15
stituted nuclear weapons." March 16, 2003, 16
NBC Meet the Press interview with Vice Presi- 17
dent Cheney. 18
- (2) Preceding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq 19
the Vice President was fully informed that no legiti- 20
mate evidence existed of weapons of mass destruc- 21
tion in Iraq. The Vice President pressured the intel- 22
ligence community to change their findings to enable 23
the deception of the citizens and Congress of the 24
United States. 25
-
- (A) Vice President Cheney and his Chief of 1
Staff, Lewis Libby, made multiple trips to the 2
CIA in 2002 to question analysts studying 3
Iraq's weapons programs and alleged links to al 4
Qaeda, creating an environment in which ana- 5
lysts felt they were being pressured to make 6
their assessments fit with the Bush administra- 7
tion's policy objectives accounts. 8
- (B) Vice President Cheney sought out 9
unverified and ultimately inaccurate raw intel- 10
ligence to prove his preconceived beliefs. This 11
strategy of cherry picking was employed to in- 12
fluence the interpretation of the intelligence. 13
- (3) The Vice President's actions corrupted or 14
attempted to corrupt the 2002 National Intelligence 15
Estimate, an intelligence document issued on Octo- 16
ber 1, 2002 and carefully considered by Congress 17
prior to the October 10, 2002 vote to authorize the 18
use of force. The Vice President's actions prevented 19
the necessary reconciliation of facts for the National 20
Intelligence Estimate which resulted in a high num- 21
ber of dissenting opinions from technical experts in 22
two Federal agencies. 23
-
- (A) The State Department's Bureau of In- 24
telligence and Research dissenting view in the 25
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 1
stated "Lacking persuasive evidence that Bagh- 2
dad has launched a coherent effort to reconsti- 3
tute it's nuclear weapons program INR is un- 4
willing to speculate that such an effort began 5
soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to 6
project a timeline for the completion of activi- 7
ties it does not now see happening. As a result 8
INR is unable to predict that Iraq could ac- 9
quire a nuclear device or weapon.". 10
- (B) The State Department's Bureau of In- 11
telligence and Research dissenting view in the 12
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 13
also stated that "Finally, the claims of Iraqi 14
pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in 15
INR's assessment, highly dubious.". 16
- (C) The State Department's Bureau of In- 17
telligence and Research dissenting view in the 18
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 19
references a Department of Energy opinion by 20
stating that "INR accepts the judgment of 21
technical experts at the US Department of En- 22
ergy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes 23
Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use 24
in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium en- 25
richment and finds unpersuasive the arguments 1
advanced by others to make the case that they 2
are intended for that purpose.". 3
The Vice President subverted the national security 4
interests of the United States by setting the stage for the 5
loss of more than 3300 United States service members; 6
the loss of 650,000 Iraqi citizens since the United States 7
invasion; the loss of approximately $500 billion in war 8
costs which has increased our Federal debt; the loss of 9
military readiness within the United States Armed Serv- 10
ices due to overextension, lack of training and lack of 11
equipment; the loss of United States credibility in world 12
affairs; and the decades of likely blowback created by the 13
invasion of Iraq. 14
In all of this, Vice President Richard B. Cheney has 15
acted in a manner contrary to his trust as Vice President, 16
and subversive of constitutional government, to the preju- 17
dice of the cause of law and justice and the manifest injury 18
of the people of the United States.Wherefore, Vice Presi- 19
dent Richard B. Cheney, by such conduct, is guilty of an 20
impeachable offense warranting removal from office. 21
Article II
In his conduct while Vice President of the United 23
States, Richard B. Cheney, in violation of his constitu- 24
tional oath to faithfully execute the office of Vice Presi- 25
dent of the United States and, to the best of his ability, 1
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 2
United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty 3
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, purposely 4
manipulated the intelligence process to deceive the citizens 5
and Congress of the United States about an alleged rela- 6
tionship between Iraq and al Qaeda in order to justify the 7
use of the United States Armed Forces against the nation 8
of Iraq in a manner damaging to our national security 9
interests, to wit: 10
- (1) Despite all evidence to the contrary, the 11
Vice President actively and systematically sought to 12
deceive the citizens and the Congress of the United 13
States about an alleged relationship between Iraq 14
and al Qaeda: 15
-
- (A) "His regime has had high-level con- 16
tacts with Al Qaeda going back a decade and 17
has provided training to Al Qaeda terrorists." 18
December 2, 2002, Speech of Vice President 19
Cheney at the Air National Guard Senior Lead- 20
ership Conference. 21
- (B) "His regime aids and protects terror- 22
ists, including members of Al Qaeda. He could 23
decide secretly to provide weapons of mass de- 24
struction to terrorists for use against us." Jan- 25
uary 30, 2003, Speech of Vice President Che- 1
ney to 30th Political Action Conference in Ar- 2
lington, Virginia. 3
- (C) "We know he's out trying once again 4
to produce nuclear weapons and we know that 5
he has a long-standing relationship with various 6
terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda organi- 7
zation." March 16, 2003, NBC Meet the Press 8
interview with Vice President Cheney. 9
- (D) "We learned more and more that there 10
was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda 11
that stretched back through most of the decade 12
of the '90s, that it involved training, for exam- 13
ple, on biological weapons and chemical weap- 14
ons..." September 14, 2003, NBC Meet the 15
Press interview with Vice President Cheney. 16
- (E) "Al Qaeda had a base of operation 17
there up in Northeastern Iraq where they ran 18
a large poisons factory for attacks against Eu- 19
ropeans and U.S. forces." October 3, 2003, 20
Speech of Vice President Cheney at Bush-Che- 21
ney '04 Fundraiser in Iowa. 22
- (F) "He also had an established relation- 23
ship with Al Qaeda providing training to Al 24
Qaeda members in areas of poisons, gases, and 25
conventional bombs." October 10, 2003, Speech 1
of Vice President Cheney to the Heritage Foun- 2
dation. 3
- (G) "Al Qaeda and the Iraqi intelligence 4
services have worked together on a number of 5
occasions." January 9, 2004, Rocky Mountain 6
News interview with Vice President Cheney. 7
- (H) "I think there's overwhelming evidence 8
that there was a connection between Al Qaeda 9
and the Iraqi government" January 22, 2004, 10
NPR: Morning Edition interview with Vice 11
President Cheney. 12
- (I) "First of all, on the question of—of 13
whether or not there was any kind of relation- 14
ship, there clearly was a relationship. It's been 15
testified to; the evidence is overwhelming." 16
June 17, 2004, CNBC: Capital Report inter- 17
view with Vice President Cheney. 18
- (2) Preceding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq 19
the Vice President was fully informed that no cred- 20
ible evidence existed of a working relationship be- 21
tween Iraq and al Qaeda, a fact articulated in sev- 22
eral official documents, including: 23
-
- (A) A classified Presidential Daily Briefing 24
ten days after the September 11, 2001 attacks 25
indicating that the United States intelligence 1
community had no evidence linking Saddam 2
Hussein to the September 11th attacks and 3
that there was "scant credible evidence that 4
Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with 5
Al Qaeda'.' 6
- (B) Defense Intelligence Terrorism Sum- 7
mary No. 044-02, issued in February 2002 by 8
the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 9
which challenged the credibility of information 10
gleaned from captured al Qaeda leader al-Libi. 11
The DIA report also cast significant doubt on 12
the possibility of a Saddam Hussein-al-Qaeda 13
conspiracy: "Saddam's regime is intensely sec- 14
ular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary move- 15
ments. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to pro- 16
vide assistance to a group it cannot control.". 17
- (C) A January 2003 British intelligence 18
classified report on Iraq that concluded that 19
"there are no current links between the Iraqi 20
regime and the al-Qaeda network". 21
The Vice President subverted the national security 22
interests of the United States by setting the stage for the 23
loss of more than 3300 United States service members; 24
the loss of 650,000 Iraqi citizens since the United States 25
invasion; the loss of approximately $500 billion in war 1
costs which has increased our Federal debt; the loss of 2
military readiness within the United States Armed Serv- 3
ices due to overextension, lack of training and lack of 4
equipment; the loss of United States credibility in world 5
affairs; and the decades of likely blowback created by the 6
invasion of Iraq. 7
In all of this, Vice President Richard B. Cheney has 8
acted in a manner contrary to his trust as Vice President, 9
and subversive of constitutional government, to the preju- 10
dice of the cause of law and justice and the manifest injury 11
of the people of the United States. 12
Wherefore, Vice President Richard B. Cheney, by 13
such conduct, is guilty of an impeachable offense war- 14
ranting removal from office. 15
Article III
In his conduct while Vice President of the United 17
States, Richard B. Cheney, in violation of his constitu- 18
tional oath to faithfully execute the office of Vice Presi- 19
dent of the United States and, to the best of his ability, 20
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 21
United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty 22
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has open- 23
ly threatened aggression against the Republic of Iran ab- 24
sent any real threat to the United States, and done so 25
with the United States proven capability to carry out such 1
threats, thus undermining the national security of the 2
United States, to wit: 3
- (1) Despite no evidence that Iran has the inten- 4
tion or the capability of attacking the United States 5
and despite the turmoil created by United States in- 6
vasion of Iraq, the Vice President has openly threat- 7
ened aggression against Iran as evidenced by the fol- 8
lowing: 9
-
- (A) "For our part, the United States is 10
keeping all options on the table in addressing 11
the irresponsible conduct of the regime. And we 12
join other nations in sending that regime a 13
clear message: We will not allow Iran to have 14
a nuclear weapon." March 7, 2006, Speech of 15
Vice President Cheney to American Israel Pub- 16
lic Affairs Committee 2006 Policy Conference. 17
- (B) "But we've also made it clear that all 18
options are on the table." January 24, 2007, 19
CNN Situation Room interview with Vice Presi- 20
dent Cheney. 21
- (C) "When we—as the President did, for 22
example, recently—deploy another aircraft car- 23
rier task force to the Gulf, that sends a very 24
strong signal to everybody in the region that 25
the United States is here to stay, that we clear- 1
ly have significant capabilities, and that we are 2
working with friends and allies as well as the 3
international organizations to deal with the Ira- 4
nian threat." January 29, 2007, Newsweek 5
interview with Vice President Cheney. 6
- (D) "But I've also made the point and the 7
President has made the point that all options 8
are still on the table." February 24, 2007, Vice 9
President Cheney at Press Briefing with Aus- 10
tralian Prime Minister in Sydney, Australia. 11
- (2) The Vice President, who repeatedly and 12
falsely claimed to have had specific, detailed knowl- 13
edge of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction 14
capabilities, is no doubt fully aware of evidence that 15
demonstrates Iran poses no real threat to the United 16
States as evidenced by the following: 17
-
- (A) "I know that what we see in Iran right 18
now is not the industrial capacity you can [use 19
to develop a] bomb." Mohamed ElBaradei, Di- 20
rector General of International Atomic Energy 21
Agency, February 19, 2007. 22
- (B) Iran indicated its "full readiness and 23
willingness to negotiate on the modality for the 24
resolution of the outstanding issues with the 25
IAEA, subject to the assurances for dealing 1
with the issues in the framework of the Agency, 2
without the interference of the United Nations 3
Security Council". IAEA Board Report, Feb- 4
ruary 22, 2007. 5
- (C) "...so whatever they have, what we 6
have seen today, is not the kind of capacity that 7
would enable them to make bombs." Mohamed 8
El Baradei, Director General of International 9
Atomic Energy Agency, February 19, 2007. 10
- (3) The Vice President is fully aware of the ac- 11
tions taken by the United States towards Iran that 12
are further destabilizing the world as evidenced by 13
the following: 14
-
- (A) The United States has refused to en- 15
gage in meaningful diplomatic relations with 16
Iran since 2002, rebuffing both bilateral and 17
multilateral offers to dialogue. 18
- (B) The United States is currently en- 19
gaged in a military buildup in the Middle East 20
that includes the increased presence of the 21
United States Navy in the waters near Iran, 22
significant United States Armed Forces in two 23
nations neighboring to Iran, and the installa- 24
tion of anti-missile technology in the region. 25
- (C) News accounts have indicated that 1
military planners have considered the B61-11, a 2
tactical nuclear weapon, as one of the options 3
to strike underground bunkers in Iran. 4
- (D) The United States has been linked to 5
anti-Iranian organizations that are attempting 6
to destabilize the Iranian government, in par- 7
ticular the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), even 8
though the state department has branded it a 9
terrorist organization. 10
- (E) News accounts indicate that United 11
States troops have been ordered into Iran to 12
collect data and establish contact with anti-gov- 13
ernment groups. 14
- (4) In the last three years the Vice President 15
has repeatedly threatened Iran. However, the Vice 16
President is legally bound by the U.S Constitution's 17
adherence to international law that prohibits threats 18
of use of force. 19
-
- (A) Article VI of the United States Con- 20
stitution states, "This Constitution, and the 21
Laws of the United States which shall be made 22
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 23
which shall be made, under the Authority of the 24
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 25
Land." Any provision of an international treaty 1
ratified by the United States becomes the law 2
of the United States. 3
- (B) The United States is a signatory to 4
the United Nations Charter, a treaty among the 5
nations of the world. Article II, Section 4 of the 6
United Nations Charter states, "All Members 7
shall refrain in their international relations 8
from the threat or use of force against the ter- 9
ritorial integrity or political independence of 10
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 11
with the Purposes of the United Nations." The 12
threat of force is illegal. 13
- (C) Article 51 lays out the only exception, 14
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 15
the inherent right of individual or collective 16
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 17
Member of the United Nations, until the Secu- 18
rity Council has taken measures necessary to 19
maintain international peace and security." 20
Iran has not attacked the United States; there- 21
fore any threat against Iran by the United 22
States is illegal. 23
The Vice President's deception upon the citizens and 24
Congress of the United States that enabled the failed 25
United States invasion of Iraq forcibly altered the rules 1
of diplomacy such that the Vice President's recent bellig- 2
erent actions towards Iran are destabilizing and counter- 3
productive to the national security of the United States. 4
In all of this, Vice President Richard B. Cheney has 5
acted in a manner contrary to his trust as Vice President, 6
and subversive of constitutional government, to the preju- 7
dice of the cause of law and justice and the manifest injury 8
of the people of the United States. 9
Wherefore Richard B. Cheney, by such conduct, war- 10
rants impeachment and trial, and removal from office. 11
|
|