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FEMA then, FEMA now
David Corn.com
Bush's Witt-less FEMA....And Why James Lee Witt Should Lead a Post-Katrina
Investigation
September 07, 2005
I posted this in my "Capital Games" column at www.thenation.com. If you've
seen it already, please scroll down to other items
In a perfect world--or at least one not so imperfect--people who make the
right call about important stuff would be rewarded and those who are wrong
would not be. That's not how things work in Bushland. Remember those lovely
medals George W. Bush handed to CIA chief George Tenet and then-Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, even though both were responsible for tremendous
miscalculations on Iraq? In recent days, there have been calls for firing
Michael Brown, the FEMA director--who got his job because he was a college chum
of George W. Bush's 2000 campaign manager. Like DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff,
Brown screwed the pooch, and both in recent days have issued CYA statements
rather than acknowledge responsibility. Yet Bush praised his FEMA guy last
week, saying, "Brownie, you're doing a heckuva job."
Let's consider an obvious comparison: Michael Brown and James Lee Witt, who
Bill Clinton appointed head of FEMA. As has been widely noted, before joining
FEMA, Brown was a lawyer for the International Arabian Horse Association.
Before Witt was tapped as FEMA chief, he had served for four years as director
of the Arkansas Office of Emergency Services. Bush placed a crony--Brown was
also an attorney for the Oklahoma Republican Party--in charge of FEMA (and
permitted the agency's disaster work to be downgraded). Clinton gave the job to
a fellow with years of experience in disaster management and maintained a close
connection to Witt and FEMA, which then had Cabinet-level status.
Brown, Chertoff and Bush were not prepared for this foreseen tragedy, but
FEMA's lack of readiness was predicted. By Witt, it turns out. In March 2004,
he testified at a hearing conducted by two House subcommittees. The issue at
hand was DHS's plan to consolidate--that is, reduce the number of--FEMA's
regional and field offices. Witt's comments were all-too perceptive. He
practically predicted the mess to come in New Orleans. As you read his
remarks--which I excerpt below--think about two things. First,
disaster-management experts outside the administration were worried about FEMA
long before Hurricane Katrina came howling. Second, the poor people of New
Orleans might have been much better off had someone who knew about disaster
relief been in charge during this tragedy. Here's a portion of Witt's
testimony:
As you continue to examine DHS and its growth, I want you to know that I and
many others in the emergency management community across the country are deeply
concerned about the direction FEMA is headed. First, we are greatly concerned
that the successful partnership that was built between local/state/federal
partners and their ability to communicate, coordinate, train, prepare, and
respond has been sharply eroded. Second, FEMA, having lost its status as an
independent agency, is being buried beneath a massive bureaucracy whose main
and seemingly only focus is fighting terrorism while an all hazards mission is
getting lost in the shuffle.
I firmly believe that FEMA should be extracted from the DHS bureaucracy and
reestablish it as an independent agency reporting directly to the President,
but allowing for the Homeland Security Secretary to task FEMA to coordinate the
Federal response following terrorist incidents. Third, the FEMA Director has
lost Cabinet status and along with it the close relationship to the President
and Cabinet Affairs. I believe we could not have been as responsive as we were
during my tenure at FEMA had there had been several levels of Federal
bureaucracy between myself and the White House. I am afraid communities across
the country are starting to suffer the impact of having FEMA buried within a
bureaucracy rather than functioning as a small but agile independent agency
that coordinates Federal response effectively and efficiently after a
disaster.
FEMA was assembled in 1979 in much the same way that the various agencies of
DHS have been put together. Although the reorganization that brought the
various agencies together under FEMA was on a much smaller and more manageable
scale, it took our country close to 15 years to get it right. When FEMA was
formed there were several cultures all being thrown together under one new
roof. The dominant "top down" culture within early FEMA traced its roots to the
days of civil defense. This culture was probably necessary for those types of
national security oriented activities. As a State Director of Emergency
Management, I was often on the receiving end of FEMA's "top down," rigid, and
sometimes inflexible approach. It is for this reason that I was determined, as
FEMA Director, to take the Agency in a new direction. I wanted to move towards
becoming an organization where the needs of the stakeholders and employees were
valued and heeded. DHS is struggling with growing pains similar to what FEMA
struggled with for the first 15 years of its existence.
However, I continue to be concerned about the scope of the task that has
been given to Under Secretary Hutchinson and Secretary Ridge. FEMA was an
agency of 2,600 permanent employees and 4,000 disaster reservists and it took
15 years to get on the right track. The reorganization taking place with DHS is
several scales above the FEMA reorganization and they are being asked to
accomplish this massive effort in a world full of uncertainty regarding future
terrorist activity and the certainty of future natural disasters. As you may
know, I was not in favor of creating such a large Department all at once. I
supported the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, but I do not think
this was accomplished in the right way. I always thought we should start with
the areas that needed the greatest and most immediate attention--specifically
those activities involving the gathering, assimilation, and dissemination of
terrorist intelligence to state and local officials. Also, I thought it made
sense to engage in efforts to improve the security of our most vulnerable
critical infrastructure and targeted industries. I felt that many of the pieces
in place to manage the consequences of a disaster or terrorist attack were not
broken and didn't need "fixing." I saw no need to reinvent the wheel on the
consequence management side of emergency management - particularly when there
were several other more pressing areas that needed to be addressed regarding
counterterrorism efforts.
In an effort to build other Directorates within DHS that need more help,
vital pieces of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate--FEMA--are
being moved or underfunded to prop up these other very critical areas.
Programs--like the very successful Fire Grants--are being moved out of FEMA.
And the Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) which provide the
backbone to our emergency management systems are being cut and significantly
restructured in a very detrimental way. In fact some estimates suggest that the
25-percent cap on personnel costs within the EMPG could result in more than
half of the country's 4,000-plus emergency managers losing their jobs. By
throwing all of these disparate pieces together in the DHS stew, we have not
only diluted the concentration on some of the most critical parts of our
counter-terrorism efforts, but we are allowing scarce resources to be directed
away from consequence management. Our Nation's emergency management system has
often been held up as an international model; however, this country's
well-oiled emergency management infrastructure--that has been built over many
years--is now in great jeopardy as DHS attempts to build capabilities in other
areas of the Department.
Imagine if Witt--or anyone with such expertise--had been running FEMA in
recent years. How many less deaths would there have been in New Orleans and
Mississippi? That question cannot be answered. But it is clear that Bush,
Chertoff and Brown let FEMA slide. And the cost for that is dead bodies
floating in the dirty waters of New Orleans. Now there's a debate over what
investigation will come in Katrina's wake. Senators Susan Collins and Joseph
Lieberman--who led the effort to create the DHS that swallowed up
FEMA--announced on Tuesday that their government affairs committee would
conduct hearings. Tom DeLay, though, seemed to say he was not eager to see any
House committees do the same. And Bush vowed that he would look into "what went
wrong" but did not endorse the creation of an independent investigation. As the
Bush administration and the Republican Congress dither over this, here's a
suggestion: at least one investigation should be independent of the
administration, and it should be led by James Lee Witt.
Future Bureaucrats, Take Note. During his March confirmation hearings, FDA
Commissioner Lester Crawford promised that the FDA would soon decide whether or
not to allow Plan B, the emergency morning-after contraceptive, to be sold
over-the-counter. But recently, the FDA decided not to decide. According to the
National Journal, when Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt
recently defended Crawford's decision, he said, "We did take action. We said
the FDA would act, and they did....Sometimes action isn't always yes or no."
Would-be government bureaucrats, remember that.
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