The American Conservative
Endorses Kerry-kinda
The American Conservative
By Scott McConnell
November 8, 2004 issue
Unfortunately, this election does not offer traditional
conservatives an easy or natural choice and has left our editors
as split as our readership. In an effort to deepen our
readers' and our own understanding of the options before
us, we've asked several of our editors and contributors to
make "the conservative case" for their favored
candidate. Their pieces, plus Taki's column closing out
this issue, constitute TAC's endorsement. —The
Editors
Kerry's the One
By Scott McConnell
There is little in John Kerry's persona or platform that
appeals to conservatives. The flip-flopper charge—the
centerpiece of the Republican campaign against Kerry—seems
overdone, as Kerry's contrasting votes are the sort of
baggage any senator of long service is likely to pick up. (Bob
Dole could tell you all about it.) But Kerry is plainly a
conventional liberal and no candidate for a future edition of
Profiles in Courage. In my view, he will always deserve censure
for his vote in favor of the Iraq War in 2002.
But this election is not about John Kerry. If he were to win,
his dearth of charisma would likely ensure him a single term. He
would face challenges from within his own party and a thwarting
of his most expensive initiatives by a Republican Congress. Much
of his presidency would be absorbed by trying to clean up the
mess left to him in Iraq. He would be constrained by the swollen
deficits and a ripe target for the next Republican nominee.
It is, instead, an election about the presidency of George W.
Bush. To the surprise of virtually everyone, Bush has turned into
an important president, and in many ways the most radical America
has had since the 19th century. Because he is the leader of
America's conservative party, he has become the
Left's perfect foil—its dream candidate. The
libertarian writer Lew Rockwell has mischievously noted parallels
between Bush and Russia's last tsar, Nicholas II: both
gained office as a result of family connections, both initiated
an unnecessary war that shattered their countries' budgets.
Lenin needed the calamitous reign of Nicholas II to create an
opening for the Bolsheviks.
Bush has behaved like a caricature of what a right-wing
president is supposed to be, and his continuation in office will
discredit any sort of conservatism for generations. The launching
of an invasion against a country that posed no threat to the
U.S., the doling out of war profits and concessions to
politically favored corporations, the financing of the war by
ballooning the deficit to be passed on to the nation's
children, the ceaseless drive to cut taxes for those outside the
middle class and working poor: it is as if Bush sought to
resurrect every false 1960s-era left-wing cliché about
predatory imperialism and turn it into administration policy. Add
to this his nation-breaking immigration proposal—Bush has
laid out a mad scheme to import immigrants to fill any job where
the wage is so low that an American can't be found to do
it—and you have a presidency that combines imperialist
Right and open-borders Left in a uniquely noxious cocktail.
During the campaign, few have paid attention to how much the
Bush presidency has degraded the image of the United States in
the world. Of course there has always been
"anti-Americanism.' After the Second World War many
European intellectuals argued for a "Third Way'
between American-style capitalism and Soviet communism, and a
generation later Europe's radicals embraced every ragged
"anti-imperialist' cause that came along. In South
America, defiance of "the Yanqui' always draws a
crowd. But Bush has somehow managed to take all these sentiments
and turbo-charge them. In Europe and indeed all over the world,
he has made the United States despised by people who used to be
its friends, by businessmen and the middle classes, by moderate
and sensible liberals. Never before have democratic foreign
governments needed to demonstrate disdain for Washington to their
own electorates in order to survive in office. The poll numbers
are shocking. In countries like Norway, Germany, France, and
Spain, Bush is liked by about seven percent of the populace. In
Egypt, recipient of huge piles of American aid in the past two
decades, some 98 percent have an unfavorable view of the United
States. It's the same throughout the Middle East.
Bush has accomplished this by giving the U.S. a novel
foreign-policy doctrine under which it arrogates to itself the
right to invade any country it wants if it feels threatened. It
is an American version of the Brezhnev Doctrine, but the latter
was at least confined to Eastern Europe. If the analogy seems
extreme, what is an appropriate comparison when a country
manufactures falsehoods about a foreign government, disseminates
them widely, and invades the country on the basis of those
falsehoods? It is not an action that any American president has
ever taken before. It is not something that "good'
countries do. It is the main reason that people all over the
world who used to consider the United States a reliable and
necessary bulwark of world stability now see us as a menace to
their own peace and security.
These sentiments mean that as long as Bush is president, we
have no real allies in the world, no friends to help us dig out
from the Iraq quagmire. More tragically, they mean that if
terrorists succeed in striking at the United States in another
9/11-type attack, many in the world will not only think of the
American victims but also of the thousands and thousands of Iraqi
civilians killed and maimed by American armed forces. The hatred
Bush has generated has helped immeasurably those trying to
recruit anti-American terrorists—indeed his policies are
the gift to terrorism that keeps on giving, as the sons and
brothers of slain Iraqis think how they may eventually take their
own revenge. Only the seriously deluded could fail to see that a
policy so central to America's survival as a free country
as getting hold of loose nuclear materials and controlling
nuclear proliferation requires the willingness of foreign
countries to provide full, 100 percent co-operation. Making
yourself into the world's most hated country is not an
obvious way to secure that help.
I've heard people who have known George W. Bush for
decades and served prominently in his father's
administration say that he could not possibly have conceived of
the doctrine of pre-emptive war by himself, that he was
essentially taken for a ride by people with a pre-existing agenda
to overturn Saddam Hussein. Bush's public performances
plainly show him to be a man who has never read or thought much
about foreign policy. So the inevitable questions are: who makes
the key foreign-policy decisions in the Bush presidency, who
controls the information flow to the president, how are various
options are presented?
The record, from published administration memoirs and in-depth
reporting, is one of an administration with a very small group of
six or eight real decision-makers, who were set on war from the
beginning and who took great pains to shut out arguments from
professionals in the CIA and State Department and the U.S. armed
forces that contradicted their rosy scenarios about easy victory.
Much has been written about the neoconservative hand guiding the
Bush presidency—and it is peculiar that one who was fired
from the National Security Council in the Reagan administration
for suspicion of passing classified material to the Israeli
embassy and another who has written position papers for an
Israeli Likud Party leader have become key players in the making
of American foreign policy.
But neoconservatism now encompasses much more than
Israel-obsessed intellectuals and policy insiders. The Bush
foreign policy also surfs on deep currents within the Christian
Right, some of which see unqualified support of Israel as part of
a godly plan to bring about Armageddon and the future kingdom of
Christ. These two strands of Jewish and Christian extremism build
on one another in the Bush presidency—and President Bush
has given not the slightest indication he would restrain either
in a second term. With Colin Powell's departure from the
State Department looming, Bush is more than ever the
"neoconian candidate.' The only way Americans will
have a presidency in which neoconservatives and the Christian
Armageddon set are not holding the reins of power is if Kerry is
elected.
If Kerry wins, this magazine will be in opposition from
Inauguration Day forward. But the most important battles will
take place within the Republican Party and the conservative
movement. A Bush defeat will ignite a huge soul-searching within
the rank-and-file of Republicandom: a quest to find out how and
where the Bush presidency went wrong. And it is then that more
traditional conservatives will have an audience to argue for a
conservatism informed by the lessons of history, based in
prudence and a sense of continuity with the American
past—and to make that case without a powerful White House
pulling in the opposite direction.
George W. Bush has come to embody a politics that is
antithetical to almost any kind of thoughtful conservatism. His
international policies have been based on the hopelessly
naïve belief that foreign peoples are eager to be liberated
by American armies—a notion more grounded in Leon
Trotsky's concept of global revolution than any sort of
conservative statecraft. His immigration
policies—temporarily put on hold while he runs for
re-election—are just as extreme. A re-elected President
Bush would be committed to bringing in millions of low-wage
immigrants to do jobs Americans "won't do.'
This election is all about George W. Bush, and those issues are
enough to render him unworthy of any conservative support.
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