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NY Times, Roberts, Conservatives lie about
intelligence report
Media Matters
November 7, 2005
In recent days, conservative pundits have repeated the false claim -- now
advanced by Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS) -- that
government investigations have already cleared the Bush administration of
"manipulat[ing]" intelligence in 2002 and 2003 as it made the case for the war
in Iraq. In fact, while several reports found that analysts felt no "pressure"
from senior policy-makers in reaching their intelligence assessments -- a
conclusion that has since been challenged by several senior intelligence
officials -- no government entity has thus far investigated and reported on
whether Bush administration officials manipulated that intelligence once they
received it.
Appearing on the November 6 broadcast of CBS' Face the Nation, Roberts, in a
discussion with host Bob Schieffer of how policy-makers used intelligence in
the buildup to the invasion, claimed that for the "Report on the U.S.
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," which the
Senate Intelligence Committee released in 2004, "we interviewed over 250
analysts, and we specifically asked them, 'Was there any political manipulation
or pressure?' Answer, 'No.' " Roberts then claimed that the March report of the
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction (i.e. the Robb-Silberman Commission) and the Butler
report on British intelligence came to the "same conclusion." Whether Roberts
was referring to the Bush administration's "manipulation" in the use of
intelligence, as The New York Times interpreted his statement, or as part of
the alleged "pressure" on analysts is unclear. If Roberts meant the former, his
assertion is simply false -- none of the investigations addressed the issue of
the administration's use or misuse of intelligence. If instead Roberts meant
"manipulation" as interchangeable with "pressure" on analysts, his assertion is
irrelevant to the issue on which Senate Democrats have demanded an
investigation, and therefore it is highly misleading. At no point did Schieffer
note that Roberts was either misrepresenting, or simply avoiding, the issue in
question, which Roberts has alternately pledged to investigate, denied pledging
to investigate, and dismissed as irresolvable: whether the administration
manipulated, fabricated, or otherwise misused intelligence in making its case
for war. The New York Times reported Roberts's remarks uncritically on November
7:
With Democrats stepping up their attacks over prewar intelligence
on Iraq, the Republican leader of the Senate Intelligence Committee said on
Sunday that the panel's initial work had found no evidence of "political
manipulation or pressure" in the use of such intelligence.
Other Republican senators made similar, false statements. Also on Face the
Nation, Schieffer did not correct Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT), who falsely claimed
that the Senate Intelligence Committee's report "showed that there was no
politics being played with this matter." Hatch added, "[T]here was no
indication whatsoever in that 500-page report, unanimously approved, that there
was any notice or knowledge that was improper." On the November 6 broadcast of
NBC's Meet the Press, host Tim Russert did not correct Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK),
who falsely asserted that the issue of the use of prewar intelligence "[has]
been looked at by three or four commissions." Coburn continued, "The question
is, 'Did somebody try to manipulate the intelligence to make a justification?'
That's the question that we want to -- and I don't think that anybody's seen
that, and where it's been looked at."
Conservative media figures have also made the false claim that the
investigations exonerated the Bush administration of manipulating intelligence,
when, in fact, the reports stated only that investigators had not found that
the administration exerted pressure on intelligence analysts to produce
particular results. For example, on the November 4 broadcast of PBS' The
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, New York Times columnist David Brooks falsely
claimed: "[T]here was a Senate intelligence report, a Butler report. There were
all of these reports. None of them found manipulation of intelligence." In the
November 14 edition of U.S. News & World Report, editor-in-chief Mortimer
B. Zuckerman cited the Senate Intelligence report and the Robb-Silberman report
to falsely claim that "the consensus view of those who investigated the
question of whether the Bush administration lied about intelligence or
distorted it, or pressured our intelligence agencies to support a commitment to
invade Iraq, is unanimous in rejecting these assertions." In the November 14
edition of The Weekly Standard, editor William Kristol joined Roberts in
blurring the line between "political manufacture," or pressure, and
"manipulation," claiming that "[T]he bipartisan Silberman-Robb commission found
no evidence of political manufacture and manipulation of intelligence" in the
run-up to the Iraq war.
Despite the many Republicans and conservatives who have pushed it, the
assertion that three government reports have exonerated the Bush administration
of mishandling intelligence is false. The yet-to-be-completed "phase two" of
the Senate Intelligence Committee report on pre-war Iraq intelligence would
mark the first assessment of whether proponents of the war exaggerated the
threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime, as Media Matters for America has
noted.
The first phase of the Senate Intelligence report determined that
intelligence assessments were not tainted by "pressure" that analysts received
from policy-makers, but the committee postponed until after the 2004
presidential election analysis of whether the Bush administration misused that
intelligence, pledging to include it in the second phase of the report. The
Robb-Silberman report similarly excluded examination of the use of
intelligence, noting: "[W]e were not authorized to investigate how policymakers
used the intelligence assessments they received from the Intelligence
Community." Finally, the Butler report focused on whether intelligence was
"distort[ed]" in assessments by the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC),
not in statements by the Bush administration. The Butler report did conclude
that President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address claim that Iraq had
"sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" was "well-founded," an
assessment that was contradicted in July 2003 by then-CIA director George J.
Tenet . But the Butler report produced no new evidence in support of this
conclusion and instead relied upon anonymous "intelligence assessments at the
time."
Even the conclusion reached in the first phase of the Senate Intelligence
report and in the Robb-Silberman report -- that analysts received no "pressure"
in gathering intelligence -- has been disputed by several senior intelligence
officials. As The American Prospect documented in its November 23 edition, W.
Patrick Lang, the former chief of the Middle East office of the Pentagon's
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), cast doubt on the conclusion that
intelligence analysts felt no pressure. The Prospect quoted Lang: "The senior
guys [Senate investigators] got together and said, 'You guys weren't pressured,
right? Right?' " The Prospect also noted that according to Ricard Kerr, a
one-time acting CIA director who "led an internal investigation of the agency's
failure to correctly analyze Iraqi weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities,"
intelligence analysts "were pressured, and heavily so."
As Sens. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), Richard J. Durbin (D-IL), and Carl Levin
(D-MI) noted in the "additional views" portion of phase one of the Senate
Intelligence report, the CIA's independent review, led by Kerr, found that
"[r]equests for reporting and analysis of [Iraq's links to al Qaeda] were
steady and heavy in the period leading up to the war, creating significant
pressure on the Intelligence Community to find evidence that supported a
connection." Rockefeller, Durbin, and Levin noted that Kerr's findings were
confirmed in a second independent investigation, by the CIA ombudsman, who
found that the "hammering" by the Bush administration on Iraq intelligence was
unusual and that Tenet "confirmed that some agency officials raised with him
personally the matter of repetitive tasking and the pressure it created during
this time period."
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