|
Gates: Sit Down and talk to Iran
Defense Link
May 14, 2008
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the American Academy of Diplomacy
MR. PICKERING: Okay. We're going to just take a minute to get the mikes on and --
(inaudible).
(Off mike commentary.) (Applause.)
MR. PICKERING: Mr. Secretary, we're delighted to have you here. And the applause before the speech
is, I think, a firm recognition, as I called you in the hall, a Stakhanovite of service for
helping us all understand the need for and building our civilian component to match our military
in both excellence and capability.
(Telephone touch tones are heard.)
That's CNN dialing in, I'm sure -- (laughter) -- if not another agency.
Mr. Secretary, I have --
(Operator instructs conference call participants.) (Laughter.)
We'll be over this in a minute, sir.
(Operator continues with instructions.) (Laughter.)
Mr. Secretary, you have been almost introduced, but I'm going to just say a few words. That was a
particularly long and neuralgic introduction to a telecon. Hopefully we --
(Operator continues with instructions.)
Is there some way we can end that, please? Can you turn it off? Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, once again, it's a delight to have you. The more important you are, the shorter the
introduction you get. Let me just mention --
(Operator continues with instructions.)
Is there something you can --
(Off mike commentary.)
But once is enough for the operator, please.
(Off mike commentary.)
Okay. Thank you very much. We're on. Okay.
I'm going to hit just the highlights. You've been secretary of Defense since December 18th, 2006.
And thank you, sir, for your service and indeed for the performance which I think all of us
admire. You were, before that, president of Texas A&M, the country's seventh largest
university. And before that, you were interim dean of the George Bush School of Government and
Public Service at Texas A&M.
From 1991 to 1993, you served as the director of Central Intelligence. And I'm told you're the
only career officer in the agency who went from entry grade to director while you were serving
there in a career of 27 years. During that time, you served nine years at the National Security
Council and were assistant to the president and deputy NSC for President George Herbert Walker
Bush.
You served on the Iraq Study Commission. And you've received, I think, more decorations and awards
than any of us can count, but I noted two awards of the National Intelligence Distinguished
Service Medal and three of the Distinguished Intelligence Medal as well as the President's
Citizen's Medal.
And it goes without saying, as I said at the beginning of this introduction, that all of us who
have served in the diplomatic service appreciate, beginning in your wonderful speech in Kansas,
the attention that you called nationally to the need for us to be able to complement in both
funding and support our civilian service, as I said a moment ago, to match our military service in
robustness and strength.
And so without further adieu, I'll ask you if you would please come to the podium. And the
secretary has said that he will speak briefly and then take questions and answers.
Thank you, again. (Applause.)
SEC. GATES: Thank you, Tom.
A lot of familiar faces in the room, so I'm happy to be here.
Let me just say a word about just three or four times in my career that really reinforced my
belief in the need to have a strong civilian component, strong diplomatic AID component, strategic
communications component to American foreign policy.
The first, actually, was during the Carter administration after the fall of the shah. And I was
working for Zbig Brzezinski and David Aaron at the time. They created at the NSC something called
the Political Intelligence Working Group to try and figure out how do we strengthen political
intelligence. How do we get a better feel for what's going on around the country? And there were a
bunch of surveys done in the course of that effort in terms of our strengths and weaknesses.
And one factoid that has always stuck in my mind from the work of that group was that in Riyadh at
that time there were two Foreign Service officers who spoke Arabic, and they spent about 40
percent of their time squiring around CoDels. And that has always stuck in my mind about what an
important country that is and the need for greater strength and particularly more political
officers.
The second experience really was my whole time at the NSC under Nixon, Ford and Carter and seeing
how important interagency cooperation was in getting things done. And I remember opening one
meeting that was on a particularly contentious subject, where the agencies were all over the
place. And I said that I had come to that job as the NSC under the illusion that we all worked for
the same government. And it was clearly an illusion. But I saw downtown the importance of
everybody working together.
The third formative experience in this respect was as I rose through the ranks at CIA, I saw how
often we were assigning case officers to use costly and sometimes risky methods to pick up
information that any good political officer could get off the street without much effort. And yet
there weren't enough numbers. And so when I was both the deputy DCI and DCI, I testified, on a
number of occasions, unfortunately only in front of the intelligence committees because the
foreign affairs committee didn't want to hear me. But I testified to the need to strengthen the
number of economic officers, the number of political officers.
And I guess the final thing I would say that had a big influence on me was as you look back at the
Cold War, clearly our strategic military forces held the Soviets at bay. But as we had this
contest around the world, in addition to various Special Forces and covert actions that were
undertaken and so on, a huge component of our success against the Soviet Union ultimately was our
diplomacy, was AID, the work of USIA, the civilian components of our government taking advantage
of the military standoff to beat the Soviets at their own game which was winning hearts and minds
at the end of the day.
So I decided to take advantage of the Landon Lecture at K State last November because I figured if
anything would get the attention of the Congress in terms of a speech on behalf of the State
Department, it would be for that speech to be given by the secretary of Defense. And I must say
that I'm fairly heartened. I actually think, for the first time in decades, there is a real
groundswell, bipartisan groundswell, on the Hill to devote more resources to the State Department
and to the civilian side of our national security.
I know that Secretary Rice has asked for 1,000 additional positions for the Foreign Service in the
'09 budget as well as significant dollar increases. And we've been very supportive. She and I
testified together in front of the House Armed Services Committee a couple of weeks ago on the
cooperation between the departments.
And just as a symbol of how well the departments are getting along, I think it's worth noting that
today is Bob Burns' first day on the job as undersecretary of State for policy. And he had lunch
with the undersecretary of Defense for policy. So I think we're off to a good start.
So why don't I stop there, and I'd be happy to take questions.
Yes.
Q When Colin Powell was with us, he put a lot of emphasis on training
saying how much the military believed in training during a career. I wonder whether or not you
feel that we're ready for that kind of push as well in developing the talents -- (inaudible) -- in
diplomacy.
SEC. GATES: Well, I think that a big problem the State Department has had both with respect to
training and to planning is that the service is too small to have a sizeable enough float of
people that are available to be pulled away from regular assignments and devote a year or six
months or two years to training or to be focused solely on the planning activity. I mean, we have
thousands of people involved in planning in the Department of Defense. And tens of thousands of
people in training at any given time in advanced training, not just basic training.
And so I think that central to the department being able to do the kind of advanced leadership and
management training and other kinds of training is an increase in the numbers that allow you to
have the float that you can perform your mission at the same time people can be assigned to go get
additional education.
Just to give you some sense of the comparable sizes, the total Foreign Service today is about
6,600. That would not quite crew one carrier strike group. So that's one reason why I think
it needs to be significantly larger.
Yes, sir.
Q You mentioned USIA – I read the Defense Science Board report which
suggests that we need institutional change with regard to our public diplomacy which is not --
(inaudible) -- great successes -- (inaudible) -- State Department in 1999. Have you seen the need
for going back, back's the wrong word – of making some new institutional arrangement
for dealing with public diplomacy or strategic communications -- (inaudible)?
SEC. GATES: Another part of the K State speech, and really one of the premises for it, was that
the institutions that essentially dominate American national security policy today, apart from the
State Department, were largely a creation of the post-war period and especially the National
Security Act of 1947 -- the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, the National
Security Council itself and so on. And one of the premises of the speech was those institutions
were fine for fighting the Cold War. But do they properly organize us for the kinds of challenges
that will face American diplomacy and national security in the 21st century?
And the implicit answer was no, that there is a need for a much greater integration of our
efforts. There is clearly a need for a better way to organize interagency collaboration. The
degree of exchange of people between the Defense Department and the State Department -- there have
always been a number of Defense folks assigned to the State Department, but there are a growing
number of State Department people now assigned to the Department of Defense and especially the
combatant commands. And one of the two deputy commanders of the new Africa Command in fact will be
a State Department ambassador.
And so are we organized properly and particularly, for example, when we're being out-communicated
by a guy in a cave? And the other side of it is as we've tried to put together these provincial
reconstruction teams, what's clear has not been a lack of will on the part of other agencies, it's
a lack of capacity.
There aren't deployable people in Agriculture and Commerce and Treasury and so on that are
prepared to go overseas, you know, when, just by comparison, at the height of the Cold War, AID
had 16,000 employees. It has 3,000 now. And AID was a deployable expeditionary agency. People
expected to go overseas, and they worked in developing countries, and they brought agronomic
skills, and they brought rule of law and governance skills and how you execute a budget and all
those kinds of things.
We don't have those kind of people now. So how do you organize the government to do these kinds of
things where we can, if we get into a place early enough, we may not need to deploy military
force?
So the basic question of the speech was, what would a National Security Act of 2007, last year,
look like? And I said, I, frankly, don't have the answers. We've got a contract out from the
Department of Defense to some academic institutions and think tanks to see if we can't come up
with some ideas.
Frankly, that proposal was ready to go when I arrived. And I've put the stops to it because I said
if the Department of Defense does this it will look like we're trying to take over everything, so
let's have the NSC do it. That's the proper place to have a study on how you reorganize the
institutions of national security. It just never got off the ground. And so finally we went ahead
with it about three or four months ago. And my hope is we'll have something that we can give a new
administration and that they can pursue.
But my view is we are not properly structured to deal with the challenges of the 21st century,
which are very complex and have to do not only with security issues but economic development, rule
of law, governance and so on.
Yes.
Q Mr. Secretary, as you know, the Foreign Service Reserve Act has passed
the House of Representatives, and it's out of committee in the Senate. And it would pass the
Senate if it could be brought to a vote. But one senator, Tom Coburn of Oklahoma, has a hold on
that bill which would solve a lot of the personnel problems to which you've just alluded. You
know, Texas is close to Oklahoma. (Laughter.) And I'm just wondering if you had any influence with
Senator Coburn or if you knew of a way that, you know, we could prevail on this bill.
SEC. GATES: I have heard about this concern from the secretary of State. (Laughs.) And the one
thought that you've given me is maybe to call my good friend David Boren. David's pretty
thoughtful and broad-minded about these issues, and he might be able to be helpful. I don't know.
I'll try.
Q That would be very helpful, sir.
SEC. GATES: Yes, sir.
Q Sam Lewis. Mr. Secretary, I was teaching some this spring -- (inaudible)
-- read a lot of the stuff from Bob Woodward and many other people about the earlier periods of
this administration. And I'm curious about this relationship between the secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs, as described in some of those accounts rather awkward and unsatisfactory. How do
you find it today? Has there been any change? Are those accounts perhaps wrong?
SEC. GATES: Well, I'm in the happy position of not having read any of those books. (Laughter.) I
started to as a member of the Iraq Study Group and, frankly, never got around to it. I would just
tell you that I think that my approach to it, essentially, in some respects, I suppose, was shaped
by dealing with the faculty senate at Texas A&M. (Laughter.) And I found them easy to work
with as long as they understood that they were respected, that they had a role, an important role,
in the process, that they in fact were responsible for executing the mission of the university. My
first message to the vice presidents and the deans, I said, the mission of this university is
teaching, research and service, and none of you do any of that, the faculty do. And so how do we
empower the faculty in a way that allows us still to run the university? And that was my approach
to the faculty senate.
And it has been my approach to the Joint Chiefs. They know that I listen. I treat them with
respect. I go down to the tank, to their space, at least once a week. They attend my staff
meetings. They have -- individual service chiefs have, on several occasions, changed my mind about
something that I have decided to do because they made a better argument. I think it's important to
have people understand that candor and bluntness is expected. And I deliver that message not only
with the Joint Chiefs but I spoke to the entire corps of cadets at West Point about two and a half
weeks ago and told them that that should be the hallmark of their careers as well because
sometimes the question is whether more junior officers can speak up and not have their careers
stunted by advancing unorthodox ideas.
So I have found the relationship with the chiefs to be pretty easy actually. And I think we have a
good relationship. My views about where procurement dollars ought to go in the future are not
identical with theirs. They know that, but they have the opportunity to make their case. I think
it's -- I spoke at a thing at the Broadmoor Hotel yesterday morning with about 50 journalists. And
one of the comments that I made, I was asked about the relationship between the secretary of State
and the secretary of Defense, and I said, the truth of the matter is during a good part of my
career, the secretary of State and the secretary of Defense loathed each other.
And the reason that I was never allowed into any political science classes was because I would
tell the students to throw away the organization chart. Personal relationships are what make
government work. And if the secretary of State and the secretary of Defense don't get along,
that's a real problem. And I said, you know, that doesn't mean they have to agree on everything.
They just have to get along and be able to work together. And the truth of the matter is if people
in the respective departments know that their bosses get along and don't want needless fights, it
has a real impact. If people discover that it's not career enhancing to try and set the
secretary's hair on fire, then I think that that message gets around.
Yes, Bob.
Q Mr. Secretary – In response to your Landon lecture, what you said
in Colorado Springs, I think everybody here is very much appreciative, as has already been said.
We've also done a study here at the American Academy -- (inaudible) -- which, if I may give it to
you, may actually help to give you some of the answers. (Inaudible)
SEC. GATES: Oh, okay.
Q (Inaudible.)
SEC. GATES: Yeah.
Q (Name inaudible.) The director of national intelligence was created amid
some controversy, amidst some arguments as to how effective that is. I'd be interested to see what
you think of the intelligence super czar, how it works, how it should work.
SEC. GATES: Well, I will be honest with you. I opposed that law, and I sent Susan Collins and Joe
Lieberman about an eight-page paper on the problems that I thought such a structure would create
and how I didn't feel that it really addressed the root problems in the intelligence community.
And I made some suggestions on how they could empower the director of Central Intelligence without
up-ending the entire process.
I would say that we have a unique opportunity right now to try and fix some of the problems in the
law. Mike McConnell will tell you that I've played a key role in persuading him to take the job as
DNI because I knew Mike when he was the J2 during the first Gulf War. I knew Mike Hayden, director
of CIA, from way back. And the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Jim Clapper was the
director of DIA when I was DCI, and was well respected.
And all four of us have known each other and worked together for a long time. And we are in the
process of crafting agreements that empower the DNI without sacrificing the authorities of the
secretary of Defense. The biggest problem all along has been that I have 85 percent of Mike's
budget. And the question is, how do you let the DNI actually run the intelligence community in a
meaningful way without further empowering it?
And the law requires that we concur, that he concur when I appoint the head of NSA or the head of
NGA or the head of NRO, as examples. But there's nothing in it about firing. And when I was
offered the job of DNI, to be the first DNI, in January of 2005, one of the reasons I turned it
down was how the hell can you run something if you can't fire anybody, and if everybody knows you
can't fire anybody.
So what Mike and I, among other things, have done is flip it. And either of us can take the
initiative to fire one of those three people, but it requires the concurrence of the other to
actually carry it out, or you can go to the president. So we're trying to craft some things that
we think are consistent with the law that correct some of the shortcomings in the law because,
frankly, the committees of the Congress, it was as much their unwillingness to surrender their own
jurisdiction as it was the authorities of the secretary of Defense or whatever.
So the short answer to your question is I think there are a lot of problems in execution and how
you actually make it work. I think we are in the process of reaching some agreements that address
some of the biggest problems in that respect.
One of the problems that we're taking advantage of the four of us being here to fix is the
security clearance problem so that everybody has the same security clearance process. I fought
that problem for 30 years, and we now have people in the right places, I think, to get it fixed.
So we're trying to get some things done while the four of us are still around.
Q (Name inaudible.) Mr. Secretary, on the issue of military and Foreign
Service working closely together on the ground in small embassies, I spent about five years in the
Pentagon working in the Special Operations community. And ambassadors in small, developing
countries love getting two or three Green Berets who would come in to do humanitarian demining or
whatever. And it became known as diplomacy multipliers, and it worked. And actually, General Hugh
Shelton spent a lot of time going to the State Department -- (inaudible). My question to you is,
rather than throwing big numbers at the problem, wouldn't it be useful, leaving aside the fact,
obviously, that you're conducting two wars, in a lot of small places around the world, which could
be tomorrow's battlefield to assign very small numbers of highly qualified military people who can
help ambassadors with few resources?
SEC. GATES: I think that one of the key areas in this is covered by what we call Section 1206
which is called "Train and Equip." And we are asking in FY '09 for three years of authority and
$500 million to do this. And the whole point of it is -- you know, our idea is to empower our
friends by improving their own security services, their own military, professionalizing
those.
And I told the West Point cadets that the most important job they may have is not commanding their
own troops but mentoring the soldiers of another country. And so I think that a big part of this
1206 program is in fact to reach out and do very much what you say. And I don't know what the
numbers will be, but in most embassies they'll be pretty small. But people who are there to
partner with the local military or security services and help train them, professionalize them and
give them capabilities so they can deal with problems at home so we don't have to.
Q Mr. Secretary, you spoke about a number of different roles the Foreign
Service has taken over the years -- (inaudible) -- wasn't able to fulfill and -- (inaudible).
We've seen considerable expansion recently in the areas that we need civilians for, as you talked
about. I'm curious if you would talk a little bit about where you have seen the military,
particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq and perhaps other places, having to fill gaps because the
civilians don't have the capacity. And where do you see sort of -- (inaudible) -- areas that you
would like to see moving back in order to use your own forces for your own mission?
SEC. GATES: Well, I think, in the whole range of activities covered by the provincial
reconstruction teams, whether it's local construction, whether it's establishing some kind of
rudimentary health care, governance, teaching people how to execute a budget. I mean, our soldiers
have stepped up and done all these things. But when they get somebody on the ground who really
knows how to do that stuff, who's spent a career doing that -- and I would tell you some of the
most effective leaders of PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq are retired ambassadors.
The military calls it a force multiplier when they get these civilians on the ground. Part of the
problem, again, is the lack of people to do this and who have skills. And so one of the reasons
that the military essentially ran the PRTs initially was that Condi had to go out and contract for
people to do it. And until the FY '07 supplemental passed and she got the money in the summer of
'07, she couldn't go out and hire these people or contract for these folks.
And so it kind of backed the process up. If we wanted to have a PRT on the ground in the early
spring, the military had to do it. But as these civilian experts came in, then we could pull our
people back. But it's in that whole realm. And it's why the whole proposal for a Civilian Reserve
Corps, and there are really three parts, I think, to Secretary Rice's proposal. The first is to
hire a couple of hundred additional people full time with these skills.
The second is to have a cadre of perhaps a couple of thousand people in the government who were
hired knowing that they would be called and be asked to deploy. But they may be in Agriculture or
Commerce or Treasury or some place like that. And so they're more like the National Guard because
they've got a different day job. They don't do this full time, but they can be called up to do
it.
And then a much larger number, the Civilian Reserve Corps, that would be people more like the
National Guard who would be in the civilian community, not working for the government but who
could be called if needed. So I think it's sort of a three-layer process.
And as you suggest, the whole thing's stuck right now. But I think that there's broad, bipartisan
support for getting on with this because they know the need. We've been up there briefing enough
about it that they realize it.
Yes.
Q (Name inaudible.) Mr. Secretary, there's a general consensus out there
that the armed forces of the United States are badly stretched these days, just as the Foreign
Service of the United States is stretched -- (inaudible). How much do you worry about the impact
on the armed forces, particularly the Army, the rank and file coming in? Are we getting the
quality out there that we need?
SEC. GATES: Well, there's no question that the Army is stretched. And we are watching the
statistics very carefully in terms of divorce rates, in terms of suicides, in terms of retention.
I will tell you that we just announced yesterday all the services have met their retention and
recruitment goals for April. The Marine Corps is expanding by 27,000, and they will meet their
goal two years early they've been so successful in recruiting without any diminution of their
standards or quality.
There is no doubt that, as I said at the Broadmoor yesterday, we would be very hard pressed to
fight another major, conventional war right now, ground war. But then I followed up by saying, but
where would we sensibly do that anyway? So it's a question of measuring risk. And I think that my
own view is the kind of struggles we're in in Afghanistan and now in Iraq are the kinds of
asymmetric conflicts that we are most likely to be engaged in as we look to the future.
Other countries are not going to come at us in a conventional war -- tank on tank, ship on ship,
fighter on fighter. I think the last time we lost a fighter in a dog fight was in the Vietnam War.
So even the near peers, if you will, if they want to do something with us in an adversarial way
militarily, they're going to do it asymmetrically, in my view. They're not going to come at our
strength. So we have to watch the situation with the military, with the Army in particular.
The Army will expand by 65,000. That will make a difference in terms of the frequency of
deployments. The numbers in Iraq are coming down, and they will continue to come down. The debate
here in Washington now is all about pacing and how fast they'll come down. We've got a number of
programs in place to try and ease the strain on families and to make more services available to
the families of soldiers and Marines who have deployed, airmen as well and Navy.
So I think there are a number of measures under way to try and alleviate the strain. I think that
the circumstances will help alleviate the strain. And I think the growth in the military will help
alleviate the strain.
With respect to the waivers, it is an interesting phenomenon. I think that last year, altogether,
there were 33,000 waivers. But I would point out that in 2001, there were 31,000. So some of what
you read in the newspapers is a little bit one-hand clapping because there's no context to
provide. And there's no question that the Army is giving more waivers.
But again, the stories are a little misleading. They talk about the lower number of high school
graduates, and it's now about 80 percent, 81 percent for the Army. They would like it to be 90
percent. But the fact is no one enters basic training without either a high school diploma or a
GED. So the notion that somebody's entering that hasn't got a high school degree is
misleading.
The conduct waivers are reviewed very carefully and by a panel of people. Hometown people are
interviewed -- coaches, religious leaders who know the potential recruit and so on. And so I think
these are informed judgments that are made about people. But it's, I mean, another sign of the
difficulty that we're having is the growing number of stop loss that we've had where somebody is
within 90 days of being mustered out, they can be kept in the military. Those numbers increased
after we went to 15-month tours. About half of them are NCOs, and they do it to maintain unit
cohesion. I expect those numbers will begin to decline in September.
So it's a long and rambling answer to your question, but there are a variety of aspects to the
problem. And I'll just say that I work on it and the deputy works on it every day in addition to
the people in the Army and the Marine Corps.
Tom.
Q (Name inaudible.) Mr. Secretary, thank you for being with us. I have a
question that may not be your favorite subject. You were on the Iraq Study Group. (Inaudible) --
and the other members sought quite assiduously to follow up in terms of implementation and general
acceptance. The view around this town is not so friendly on what has been done by the way of
follow up. What do you believe should be done in terms of what hasn't been done? Is there
something else that has changed that needs to be focused on in terms of attention on this very
difficult question? And is there a role in this process that most of us haven't seen yet for
diplomacy, as the study group pointed out, particularly in connection to the region?
SEC. GATES: Well, there are two things. I need to decipher which one you're talking about. Lee and
Kean headed the 9/11 commission, and that's the one --
Q I'm sorry, my apologies.
SEC. GATES: So are you talking about Lee and Jim Baker and the Iraq Study Group?
Q Yes, sir. Pardon me.
SEC. GATES: Okay. Well, I think that -- I mean, there was some interest in trying to get some
follow up on that. But I think it just didn't get off the ground for whatever set of reasons,
unlike the 9/11 commission which really was vigorous afterward in trying to make sure people were
following up.
The reality is, I think, most of the recommendations of the group are in fact being followed. And
if you read the report carefully, you'll even see that there was a recommendation in there for a
surge. And the original recommendations were actually much larger than the president eventually
did.
I think that the one area where the Iraq Study Group recommendations have not been followed up is
in terms of reaching out the Iranians. And I would just tell you I've gone through kind of an
evolution on this myself. I co-chaired with Zbig a Council on Foreign Relations study on U.S.
policy toward Iran, in 2004. But we were looking at a different Iran in many respects. We were
looking at an Iran where Khatami was the president. We were looking at an Iran where their
behavior in Iraq actually was fairly ambivalent in 2004. They were doing some things that were not
helpful, but they were also doing some things that were helpful.
And one of the questions that I think historians will have to take a look at is whether there was
a missed opportunity at that time. But with the election of Ahmadinejad and the very unambiguous
role that Iran is playing in a negative sense in Iraq today, you know, I sort of sign up with Tom
Friedman's column today. We need to figure out a way to develop some leverage with respect to the
Iranians and then sit down and talk with them. If there's going to be a discussion, then they need
something, too. We can't go to a discussion and be completely the demander with them not feeling
that they need anything from us.
I think that my own view, just my personal view, would be we ought to look for ways outside of
government to open up the channels and get more of a flow of people back and forth. There are
actually a fair number of Iranians that come to the United States to visit. We ought to increase
the flow going the other way, not of Iranians but of Americans. And I think that may be one
opening that creates some space, perhaps, over some period of time.
Yeah.
Q Several questions have looked at something that you mentioned in your
Kansas speech and have also mentioned today, which is how the military was called upon in Iraq and
Afghanistan to take on roles that perhaps they weren't trained for and were not best suited for.
You said, again, today -- (inaudible) -- that one way to solve that is to increase training and
increase personnel and budget for the State Department. Yet with AFRICOM, some of the plans for
SOUTHCOM, at least in their original conception, have called for increasing those capabilities
inside the military to allow the military to become more involved in development, to allow it to
be doing things, particularly in Africa, that it hasn't done in the past and in fact is already
doing in some respect in Africa. There's been a lot of pushback on that from diplomats, from the
NGO community and some of the Africans themselves. So does that lead you to any rethinking of how
those initiatives should operate and what their mission should be?
SEC. GATES: I think, in some respects, we probably didn't do as good a job as we should have when
we rolled out AFRICOM. I wasn't here when the decision was made to build an Africa Command, but I
think my view at this point is that deeds are going to count for more than words. And I think we
need to take it a step at a time. I don't think we should push African governments to a place that
they don't really want to go in terms of these relationships. I think we start with those that are
interested in developing relationships.
And I see it focused more on things like peacekeeping, on professionalizing the military, on
improving their own indigenous capabilities, the relationships between the military and civilians
in a democracy. There may be some areas of humanitarian assistance, whether it's the equivalent of
what we did after the tsunami or after the Pakistani earthquake or what we're trying to do with
Burma, there are going to be situations where the military is going to be the first in and have to
deal with problems initially and where they then should be replaced by civilians with the
expertise in dealing with the humanitarian disasters and so on where we are the ones that really
only have the capability.
So I think we have to be cautious about the way we move in this direction. But I think that when I
see -- I was just in Mexico City. I discovered I was the first secretary of Defense to be in
Mexico City in 12 years and only the second secretary of Defense ever, and Bill Perry was the
first. But when I see the carefully developing relationship there, and it's a government that's
been cautious about developing military-to-military relationships with the United States, but as
we move step by step and do useful things together, I think we can develop those relationships. So
that would be my approach to both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM.
MR. PICKERING: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to use my chairman's prerogative to interrupt at this point
because this group is good to go for another hour. And you've been very kind to give us 45 minutes
of your time. And I promised you I would escort you out of here at the end of that time, and that
time has come.
I want to, on behalf of all of us, thank you for coming. Thank you for your candor, your
directness and your frankness. And thank you for your continued support of our national security
and the role of the nonmilitary civilian side in making all that come out the right way.
(Applause.)
(C) COPYRIGHT 2008, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE.
NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION
OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED.
UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER
APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION.
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO
COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES.
FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400.
|
|