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The System Was Blinking
Red
The 911 Report
Chapter 8
As 2001 began, counterterrorism officials were receiving
frequent but fragmentary reports about threats. Indeed, there
appeared to be possible threats almost everywhere the United
States had interests--including at home.
To understand how the escalation in threat reporting was
handled in the summer of 2001, it is useful to understand how
threat information in general is collected and conveyed.
Information is collected through several methods, including
signals intelligence and interviews of human sources, and
gathered into intelligence reports. Depending on the source and
nature of the reporting, these reports may be highly
classified--and therefore tightly held--or less sensitive and
widely disseminated to state and local law enforcement agencies.
Threat reporting must be disseminated, either through individual
reports or through threat advisories. Such advisories, intended
to alert their recipients, may address a specific threat or be a
general warning.
Because the amount of reporting is so voluminous, only a
select fraction can be chosen for briefing the president and
senior officials. During 2001, Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet was briefed regularly regarding threats and other
operational information relating to Usama Bin Ladin.1 He in turn
met daily with President Bush, who was briefed by the CIA through
what is known as the President's Daily Brief (PDB). Each PDB
consists of a series of six to eight relatively short articles or
briefs covering a broad array of topics; CIA staff decides which
subjects are the most important on any given day. There were more
than 40 intelligence articles in the PDBs from January 20 to
September 10, 2001, that related to Bin Ladin. The PDB is
considered highly sensitive and is distributed to only a handful
of high-level officials.2
The Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), distributed to
a broader group of officials, has a similar format and generally
covers the same subjects as the PDB. It usually contains less
information so as to protect sources and methods. Like their
predecessors, the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and Richard
Clarke, the National Security Council (NSC) counterterrorism
coordinator, all received the SEIB, not the PDB.3 Clarke and his
staff had extensive access to terrorism reporting, but they did
not have access to internal, nondisseminated information at the
National Security Agency (NSA), CIA, or FBI.
The Drumbeat Begins
In the spring of 2001, the level of reporting on terrorist
threats and planned attacks increased dramatically to its highest
level since the millennium alert. At the end of March, the
intelligence community disseminated a terrorist threat advisory,
indicating a heightened threat of Sunni extremist terrorist
attacks against U.S. facilities, personnel, and other
interests.4
On March 23, in connection with discussions about possibly
reopening Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, Clarke
warned National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that domestic
or foreign terrorists might use a truck bomb--their "weapon of
choice"--on Pennsylvania Avenue. That would result, he said, in
the destruction of the West Wing and parts of the residence.5 He
also told her that he thought there were terrorist cells within
the United States, including al Qaeda.
The next week, Rice was briefed on the activities of Abu
Zubaydah and on CIA efforts to locate him. As pointed out in
chapter 6, Abu Zubaydah had been a major figure in the millennium
plots. Over the next few weeks, the CIA repeatedly issued
warnings--including calls from DCI Tenet to Clarke--that Abu
Zubaydah was planning an operation in the near future. One report
cited a source indicating that Abu Zubaydah was planning an
attack in a country that CIA analysts thought might be Israel, or
perhaps Saudi Arabia or India. Clarke relayed these reports to
Rice.6
In response to these threats, the FBI sent a message to all
its field offices on April 13, summarizing reporting to date. It
asked the offices to task all resources, including human sources
and electronic databases, for any information pertaining to
"current operational activities relating to Sunni extremism." It
did not suggest that there was a domestic threat.7
The interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) that
Clarke chaired discussed the Abu Zubaydah reports on April 19.The
next day, a briefing to top officials reported "Bin Ladin
planning multiple operations." When the deputies discussed al
Qaeda policy on April 30, they began with a briefing on the
threat.8
In May 2001, the drumbeat of reporting grew louder with
reports to top officials that "Bin Ladin public profile may
presage attack" and "Bin Ladin network's plans advancing." In
early May, a walk-in to the FBI claimed there was a plan to
launch attacks on London, Boston, and New York. Attorney General
John Ashcroft was briefed by the CIA on May 15 regarding al Qaeda
generally and the current threat reporting specifically. The next
day brought a report that a phone call to a U.S. embassy had
warned that Bin Ladin supporters were planning an attack in the
United States using "high explosives." On May 17, based on the
previous day's report, the first item on the CSG's agenda was
"UBL: Operation Planned in U.S."9 The anonymous caller's tip
could not be corroborated.
Late May brought reports of a possible hostage plot against
Americans abroad to force the release of prisoners, including
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh," who was serving a
life sentence for his role in the 1993 plot to blow up sites in
New York City. The reporting noted that operatives might opt to
hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. This report led to a
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) information circular to
airlines noting the potential for "an airline hijacking to free
terrorists incarcerated in the United States." Other reporting
mentioned that Abu Zubaydah was planning an attack, possibly
against Israel, and expected to carry out several more if things
went well. On May 24 alone, counterterrorism officials grappled
with reports alleging plots in Yemen and Italy, as well as a
report about a cell in Canada that an anonymous caller had
claimed might be planning an attack against the United
States.10
Reports similar to many of these were made available to
President Bush in morning intelligence briefings with DCI Tenet,
usually attended by Vice President Dick Cheney and National
Security Advisor Rice. While these briefings discussed general
threats to attack America and American interests, the specific
threats mentioned in these briefings were all overseas.
On May 29, Clarke suggested that Rice ask DCI Tenet what more
the United States could do to stop Abu Zubaydah from launching "a
series of major terrorist attacks," probably on Israeli targets,
but possibly on U.S. facilities. Clarke wrote to Rice and her
deputy, Stephen Hadley, "When these attacks occur, as they likely
will, we will wonder what more we could have done to stop them."
In May, CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC) Chief Cofer Black told
Rice that the current threat level was a 7 on a scale of 1 to 10,
as compared to an 8 during the millennium.11
High Probability of Near-Term "Spectacular" Attacks
Threat reports surged in June and July, reaching an even
higher peak of urgency. The summer threats seemed to be focused
on Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and possibly
Rome, but the danger could be anywhere-- including a possible
attack on the G-8 summit in Genoa. A June 12 CIA report passing
along biographical background information on several terrorists
mentioned, in commenting on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that he was
recruiting people to travel to the United States to meet with
colleagues already there so that they might conduct terrorist
attacks on Bin Ladin's behalf. On June 22, the CIA notified all
its station chiefs about intelligence suggesting a possible al
Qaeda suicide attack on a U.S. target over the next few days. DCI
Tenet asked that all U.S. ambassadors be briefed.12
That same day, the State Department notified all embassies of
the terrorist threat and updated its worldwide public warning. In
June, the State Department initiated the Visa Express program in
Saudi Arabia as a security measure, in order to keep long lines
of foreigners away from vulnerable embassy spaces. The program
permitted visa applications to be made through travel agencies,
instead of directly at the embassy or consulate.13
A terrorist threat advisory distributed in late June indicated
a high probability of near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks
resulting in numerous casualties. Other reports' titles warned,
"Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent" and "Bin Ladin and Associates
Making Near-Term Threats." The latter reported multiple attacks
planned over the coming days, including a "severe blow" against
U.S. and Israeli "interests" during the next two weeks.14
On June 21, near the height of the threat reporting, U.S.
Central Command raised the force protection condition level for
U.S. troops in six countries to the highest possible level,
Delta. The U.S. Fifth Fleet moved out of its port in Bahrain, and
a U.S. Marine Corps exercise in Jordan was halted. U.S. embassies
in the Persian Gulf conducted an emergency security review, and
the embassy in Yemen was closed. The CSG had foreign emergency
response teams, known as FESTs, ready to move on four hours'
notice and kept up the terrorism alert posture on a "rolling 24
hour basis."15
On June 25, Clarke warned Rice and Hadley that six separate
intelligence reports showed al Qaeda personnel warning of a
pending attack. An Arabic television station reported Bin Ladin's
pleasure with al Qaeda leaders who were saying that the next
weeks "will witness important surprises" and that U.S. and
Israeli interests will be targeted. Al Qaeda also released a new
recruitment and fund-raising tape. Clarke wrote that this was all
too sophisticated to be merely a psychological operation to keep
the United States on edge, and the CIA agreed. The intelligence
reporting consistently described the upcoming attacks as
occurring on a calamitous level, indicating that they would cause
the world to be in turmoil and that they would consist of
possible multiple--but not necessarily
simultaneous--attacks.16
On June 28, Clarke wrote Rice that the pattern of al Qaeda
activity indicating attack planning over the past six weeks "had
reached a crescendo.""A series of new reports continue to
convince me and analysts at State, CIA, DIA [Defense Intelligence
Agency], and NSA that a major terrorist attack or series of
attacks is likely in July," he noted. One al Qaeda intelligence
report warned that something "very, very, very, very" big was
about to happen, and most of Bin Ladin's network was reportedly
anticipating the attack. In late June, the CIA ordered all its
station chiefs to share information on al Qaeda with their host
governments and to push for immediate disruptions of cells.17
The headline of a June 30 briefing to top officials was
stark:"Bin Ladin Planning High-Profile Attacks." The report
stated that Bin Ladin operatives expected near-term attacks to
have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportions. That same
day, Saudi Arabia declared its highest level of terror alert.
Despite evidence of delays possibly caused by heightened U.S.
security, the planning for attacks was continuing.18
On July 2, the FBI Counterterrorism Division sent a message to
federal agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies
summarizing information regarding threats from Bin Ladin. It
warned that there was an increased volume of threat reporting,
indicating a potential for attacks against U.S. targets abroad
from groups "aligned with or sympathetic to Usama Bin Ladin."
Despite the general warnings, the message further stated, "The
FBI has no information indicating a credible threat of terrorist
attack in the United States." However, it went on to emphasize
that the possibility of attack in the United States could not be
discounted. It also noted that the July 4 holiday might heighten
the threats. The report asked recipients to "exercise extreme
vigilance" and "report suspicious activities" to the FBI. It did
not suggest specific actions that they should take to prevent
attacks.19
Disruption operations against al Qaeda-affiliated cells were
launched involving 20 countries. Several terrorist operatives
were detained by foreign governments, possibly disrupting
operations in the Gulf and Italy and perhaps averting attacks
against two or three U.S. embassies. Clarke and others told us of
a particular concern about possible attacks on the Fourth of
July. After it passed uneventfully, the CSG decided to maintain
the alert.20
To enlist more international help, Vice President Cheney
contacted Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5. Hadley
apparently called European counterparts, while Clarke worked with
senior officials in the Gulf. In late July, because of threats,
Italy closed the airspace over Genoa and mounted antiaircraft
batteries at the Genoa airport during the G-8 summit, which
President Bush attended.21
At home, the CSG arranged for the CIA to brief intelligence
and security officials from several domestic agencies. On July 5,
representatives from the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), the FAA, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, Customs, the
CIA, and the FBI met with Clarke to discuss the current threat.
Attendees report that they were told not to disseminate the
threat information they received at the meeting. They interpreted
this direction to mean that although they could brief their
superiors, they could not send out advisories to the field. An
NSC official recalls a somewhat different emphasis, saying that
attendees were asked to take the information back to their home
agencies and "do what you can" with it, subject to classification
and distribution restrictions. A representative from the INS
asked for a summary of the information that she could share with
field offices. She never received one.22
That same day, the CIA briefed Attorney General Ashcroft on
the al Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack
was imminent. Ashcroft was told that preparations for multiple
attacks were in late stages or already complete and that little
additional warning could be expected. The briefing addressed only
threats outside the United States.23
The next day, the CIA representative told the CSG that al
Qaeda members believed the upcoming attack would be
"spectacular," qualitatively different from anything they had
done to date.24
Apparently as a result of the July 5 meeting with Clarke, the
interagency committee on federal building security was tasked to
examine security measures. This committee met on July 9, when 37
officials from 27 agencies and organizations were briefed on the
"current threat level" in the United States. They were told that
not only the threat reports from abroad but also the recent
convictions in the East Africa bombings trial, the conviction of
Ahmed Ressam, and the just-returned Khobar Towers indictments
reinforced the need to "exercise extreme vigilance." Attendees
were expected to determine whether their respective agencies
needed enhanced security measures.25
On July 18, 2001, the State Department provided a warning to
the public regarding possible terrorist attacks in the Arabian
Peninsula.26
Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard told us he had one of his
periodic conference calls with all special agents in charge on
July 19. He said one of the items he mentioned was the need, in
light of increased threat reporting, to have evidence response
teams ready to move at a moment's notice, in case of an attack.27
He did not task field offices to try to determine whether any
plots were being considered within the United States or to take
any action to disrupt any such plots.
In mid-July, reporting started to indicate that Bin Ladin's
plans had been delayed, maybe for as long as two months, but not
abandoned. On July 23, the lead item for CSG discussion was still
the al Qaeda threat, and it included mention of suspected
terrorist travel to the United States.28
On July 31, an FAA circular appeared alerting the aviation
community to "reports of possible near-term terrorist
operations... particularly on the Arabian Peninsula and/or
Israel." It stated that the FAA had no credible evidence of
specific plans to attack U.S. civil aviation, though it noted
that some of the "currently active" terrorist groups were known
to "plan and train for hijackings" and were able to build and
conceal sophisticated explosive devices in luggage and consumer
products.29
Tenet told us that in his world "the system was blinking red."
By late July, Tenet said, it could not "get any worse."30 Not
everyone was convinced. Some asked whether all these threats
might just be deception. On June 30, the SEIB contained an
article titled "Bin Ladin Threats Are Real." Yet Hadley told
Tenet in July that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
questioned the reporting. Perhaps Bin Ladin was trying to study
U.S. reactions. Tenet replied that he had already addressed the
Defense Department's questions on this point; the reporting was
convincing. To give a sense of his anxiety at the time, one
senior official in the Counterterrorist Center told us that he
and a colleague were considering resigning in order to go public
with their concerns.31
The Calm Before the Storm
On July 27, Clarke informed Rice and Hadley that the spike in
intelligence about a near-term al Qaeda attack had stopped. He
urged keeping readiness high during the August vacation period,
warning that another report suggested an attack had just been
postponed for a few months "but will still happen."32
On August 1, the FBI issued an advisory that in light of the
increased volume of threat reporting and the upcoming anniversary
of the East Africa embassy bombings, increased attention should
be paid to security planning. It noted that although most of the
reporting indicated a potential for attacks on
U.S. interests abroad, the possibility of an attack in the
United States could not be discounted.33
On August 3, the intelligence community issued an advisory
concluding that the threat of impending al Qaeda attacks would
likely continue indefinitely. Citing threats in the Arabian
Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, the advisory suggested
that al Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in
security before moving forward with the planned attacks.34
During the spring and summer of 2001, President Bush had on
several occasions asked his briefers whether any of the threats
pointed to the United States. Reflecting on these questions, the
CIA decided to write a briefing article summarizing its
understanding of this danger. Two CIA analysts involved in
preparing this briefing article believed it represented an
opportunity to communicate their view that the threat of a Bin
Ladin attack in the United States remained both current and
serious.35 The result was an article in the August 6 Presidential
Daily Brief titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US." It was
the 36th PDB item briefed so far that year that related to Bin
Ladin or al Qaeda, and the first devoted to the possibility of an
attack in the United States.
The President told us the August 6 report was historical in
nature. President Bush said the article told him that al Qaeda
was dangerous, which he said he had known since he had become
President. The President said Bin Ladin had long been talking
about his desire to attack America. He recalled some operational
data on the FBI, and remembered thinking it was heartening that
70 investigations were under way. As best he could recollect,
Rice had mentioned that the Yemenis' surveillance of a federal
building in New York had been looked into in May and June, but
there was no actionable intelligence.
He did not recall discussing the August 6 report with the
Attorney General or whether Rice had done so. He said that if his
advisers had told him there was a cell in the United States, they
would have moved to take care of it. That never happened.36
Although the following day's SEIB repeated the title of this
PDB, it did not contain the reference to hijackings, the alert in
New York, the alleged casing of buildings in New York, the threat
phoned in to the embassy, or the fact that the FBI had
approximately 70 ongoing bin Ladin-related investigations.38 No
CSG or other NSC meeting was held to discuss the possible threat
of a strike in the United States as a result of this report.
The following is the text of an item from the Presidential
Daily Brief received by President George W. Bush on August 6,
2001.37Redacted material is indicated by brackets.
Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US
Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate
Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in
the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and
1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade
Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to
America."
After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998,
Bin
Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington,
according to a [--] service.
An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [--] service
at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the
operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.
The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part
of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist
strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI
that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International
Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah
encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also
said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US
attack.
Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles
operation.
Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the
US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he
prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by
setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of
the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported
in 1997.
Al-Qa'ida members--including some who are US citizens--have
resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group
apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks.
Two al-Qua' da members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our
embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ
member lived in California in the mid-1990s.
A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New
York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.
We have not been able to corroborate some of the more
sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [--] service in
1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain
the release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and other
US-held extremists.
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates
patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with
preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including
recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.
The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field
investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin
Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our
Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin
supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.
Late in the month, a foreign service reported that Abu
Zubaydah was considering mounting terrorist attacks in the United
States, after postponing possible operations in Europe. No
targets, timing, or method of attack were provided.39
We have found no indication of any further discussion before
September 11 among the President and his top advisers of the
possibility of a threat of an al Qaeda attack in the United
States. DCI Tenet visited President Bush in Crawford, Texas, on
August 17 and participated in PDB briefings of the President
between August 31 (after the President had returned to
Washington) and September 10. But Tenet does not recall any
discussions with the President of the domestic threat during this
period.40
Most of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of
2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were
unprecedented. Many officials told us that they knew something
terrible was planned, and they were desperate to stop it. Despite
their large number, the threats received contained few specifics
regarding time, place, method, or target. Most suggested that
attacks were planned against targets overseas; others indicated
threats against unspecified "U.S. interests." We cannot say for
certain whether these reports, as dramatic as they were, related
to the 9/11 attacks.
Government Response to the Threats
National Security Advisor Rice told us that the CSG was the
"nerve center" for running the crisis, although other senior
officials were involved over the course of the summer. In
addition to his daily meetings with President Bush, and weekly
meetings to go over other issues with Rice, Tenet was speaking
regularly with Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The foreign policy principals routinely
talked on the telephone every day on a variety of topics.41
Hadley told us that before 9/11, he and Rice did not feel they
had the job of coordinating domestic agencies. They felt that
Clarke and the CSG (part of the NSC) were the NSC's bridge
between foreign and domestic threats.42
There was a clear disparity in the levels of response to
foreign versus domestic threats. Numerous actions were taken
overseas to disrupt possible attacks-- enlisting foreign partners
to upset terrorist plans, closing embassies, moving military
assets out of the way of possible harm. Far less was done
domestically-- in part, surely, because to the extent that
specifics did exist, they pertained to threats overseas. As noted
earlier, a threat against the embassy in Yemen quickly resulted
in its closing. Possible domestic threats were more vague. When
reports did not specify where the attacks were to take place,
officials presumed that they would again be overseas, though they
did not rule out a target in the United States. Each of the FBI
threat advisories made this point.43
Clarke mentioned to National Security Advisor Rice at least
twice that al Qaeda sleeper cells were likely in the United
States. In January 2001, Clarke forwarded a strategy paper to
Rice warning that al Qaeda had a presence in the United States.
He noted that two key al Qaeda members in the Jordanian cell
involved in the millennium plot were naturalized U.S. citizens
and that one jihadist suspected in the East Africa bombings had
"informed the FBI that an extensive network of al Qida 'sleeper
agents' currently exists in the US." He added that Ressam's
abortive December 1999 attack revealed al Qaeda supporters in the
United States.44 His analysis, however, was based not on new
threat reporting but on past experience.
The September 11 attacks fell into the void between the
foreign and domestic threats. The foreign intelligence agencies
were watching overseas, alert to foreign threats to U.S.
interests there. The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence
of a domestic threat from sleeper cells within the United States.
No one was looking for a foreign threat to domestic targets. The
threat that was coming was not from sleeper cells. It was
foreign--but from foreigners who had infiltrated into the United
States.
A second cause of this disparity in response is that domestic
agencies did not know what to do, and no one gave them direction.
Cressey told us that the CSG did not tell the agencies how to
respond to the threats. He noted that the agencies that were
operating overseas did not need direction on how to respond; they
had experience with such threats and had a "playbook." In
contrast, the domestic agencies did not have a game plan. Neither
the NSC (including the CSG) nor anyone else instructed them to
create one.45
This lack of direction was evident in the July 5 meeting with
representatives from the domestic agencies. The briefing focused
on overseas threats. The domestic agencies were not questioned
about how they planned to address the threat and were not told
what was expected of them. Indeed, as noted earlier, they were
specifically told they could not issue advisories based on the
briefing.46 The domestic agencies' limited response indicates
that they did not perceive a call to action.
Clarke reflected a different perspective in an email to Rice
on September 15, 2001. He summarized the steps taken by the CSG
to alert domestic agencies to the possibility of an attack in the
United States. Clarke concluded that domestic agencies, including
the FAA, knew that the CSG believed a major al Qaeda attack was
coming and could be in the United States.
Although the FAA had authority to issue security directives
mandating new security procedures, none of the few that were
released during the summer of 2001 increased security at
checkpoints or on board aircraft. The information circulars
mostly urged air carriers to "exercise prudence" and be alert.
Prior to 9/11, the FAA did present a CD-ROM to air carriers and
airport authorities describing the increased threat to civil
aviation. The presentation mentioned the possibility of suicide
hijackings but said that "fortunately, we have no indication that
any group is currently thinking in that direction."47 The FAA
conducted 27 special security briefings for specific air carriers
between May 1, 2001, and September 11, 2001.Two of these
briefings discussed the hijacking threat overseas. None discussed
the possibility of suicide hijackings or the use of aircraft as
weapons. No new security measures were instituted.48
Rice told us she understood that the FBI had tasked its 56
U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of suspected
terrorists and to reach out to informants who might have
information about terrorist plots. An NSC staff document at the
time describes such a tasking as having occurred in late June but
does not indicate whether it was generated by the NSC or the FBI.
Other than the previously described April 13 communication sent
to all FBI field offices, however, the FBI could not find any
record of having received such a directive. The April 13 document
asking field offices to gather information on Sunni extremism did
not mention any possible threat within the United States and did
not order surveillance of suspected operatives. The NSC did not
specify what the FBI's directives should contain and did not
review what had been issued earlier.49
Acting FBI Director Pickard told us that in addition to his
July 19 conference call, he mentioned the heightened terrorist
threat in individual calls with the special agents in charge of
field offices during their annual performance review discussions.
In speaking with agents around the country, we found little
evidence that any such concerns had reached FBI personnel beyond
the New York Field Office.50
The head of counterterrorism at the FBI, Dale Watson, said he
had many discussions about possible attacks with Cofer Black at
the CIA. They had expected an attack on July 4. Watson said he
felt deeply that something was going to happen. But he told us
the threat information was "nebulous." He wished he had known
more. He wished he had had "500 analysts looking at Usama Bin
Ladin threat information instead of two."51
Attorney General Ashcroft was briefed by the CIA in May and by
Pickard in early July about the danger. Pickard said he met with
Ashcroft once a week in late June, through July, and twice in
August. There is a dispute regarding Ashcroft's interest in
Pickard's briefings about the terrorist threat situation. Pickard
told us that after two such briefings Ashcroft told him that he
did not want to hear about the threats anymore. Ashcroft denies
Pickard's charge. Pickard says he continued to present terrorism
information during further briefings that summer, but nothing
further on the "chatter" the U.S. government was receiving.52
The Attorney General told us he asked Pickard whether there
was intelligence about attacks in the United States and that
Pickard said no. Pickard said he replied that he could not assure
Ashcroft that there would be no attacks in the United States,
although the reports of threats were related to overseas targets.
Ashcroft said he therefore assumed the FBI was doing what it
needed to do. He acknowledged that in retrospect, this was a
dangerous assumption. He did not ask the FBI what it was doing in
response to the threats and did not task it to take any specific
action. He also did not direct the INS, then still part of the
Department of Justice, to take any specific action.53
In sum, the domestic agencies never mobilized in response to
the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan
to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation
systems were not fortified. Electronic surveillance was not
targeted against a domestic threat.54 State and local law
enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI's efforts. The
public was not warned.
The terrorists exploited deep institutional failings within
our government. The question is whether extra vigilance might
have turned up an opportunity to disrupt the plot. As seen in
chapter 7, al Qaeda's operatives made mistakes. At least two such
mistakes created opportunities during 2001, especially in late
August.
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