CIA Tortured, Murdered Afghan
POW
The Washington Post
By Dana Priest
CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, March 3, 2005; Page A01
In November 2002, a newly minted CIA case officer in charge
of a secret prison just north of Kabul allegedly ordered guards
to strip naked an uncooperative young Afghan detainee, chain him
to the concrete floor and leave him there overnight without
blankets, according to four U.S. government officials aware of
the case.
The Afghan guards -- paid by the CIA and working under CIA
supervision in an abandoned warehouse code-named the Salt Pit --
dragged their captive around on the concrete floor, bruising and
scraping his skin, before putting him in his cell, two of the
officials said.
As night fell, so, predictably, did the temperature.
By morning, the Afghan man had frozen to death.
After a quick autopsy by a CIA medic -- "hypothermia" was
listed as the cause of death -- the guards buried the Afghan, who
was in his twenties, in an unmarked, unacknowledged cemetery used
by Afghan forces, officials said. The captive's family has never
been notified; his remains have never been returned for burial.
He is on no one's registry of captives, not even as a "ghost
detainee," the term for CIA captives held in military prisons but
not registered on the books, they said.
"He just disappeared from the face of the earth," said one
U.S. government official with knowledge of the case.
The CIA case officer, meanwhile, has been promoted, two of the
officials said, who like others interviewed for this article
spoke on the condition of anonymity because they are not
authorized to talk about the matter. The case is under
investigation by the CIA inspector general.
The fact that the Salt Pit case has remained secret for more
than two years reflects how little is known about the CIA's
treatment of detainees and its handling of allegations of abuse.
The public airing of abuse at Abu Ghraib prompted the Pentagon to
undertake and release scathing reports about conduct by military
personnel, to revise rules for handling prisoners, and to
prosecute soldiers accused of wrongdoing. There has been no
comparable public scrutiny of the CIA, whose operations and
briefings to Congress are kept classified by the
administration.
Thirty-three military workers have been court-martialed and an
additional 55 received reprimands for their mishandling of
detainees, according to the Defense Department. One CIA
contractor has been charged with a crime related to allegations
of detainee abuse. David A. Passaro is on trial in federal court
in North Carolina, facing four assault charges in connection with
the death of Abdul Wali, a prisoner who died while at a U.S.
military firebase in Afghanistan in June 2003.
The CIA's inspector general is investigating at least half a
dozen allegations of serious abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan,
including two previously reported deaths in Iraq, one in
Afghanistan and the death at the Salt Pit, U.S. officials
said.
A CIA spokesman said yesterday that the agency actively
pursues allegations of misconduct. Other U.S. officials said CIA
cases can take longer to resolve because, unlike the military,
the agency must rely on the Justice Department to conduct its own
review and to prosecute when warranted.
"The agency has an aggressive, robust office of the inspector
general with the authority to look into any CIA program or
operation anywhere," said a CIA representative who spoke on the
condition of anonymity. "The inspector general has done so and
will continue to do so. We investigate allegations of abuse
fully." The spokesman declined to comment on any case.
The Salt Pit was the top-secret name for an abandoned brick
factory, a warehouse just north of the Kabul business district
that the CIA began using shortly after the United States invaded
Afghanistan in October 2001. The 10-acre facility included a
three-story building, eventually used by the U.S. military to
train the Afghan counterterrorism force, and several smaller
buildings, which were off-limits to all but the CIA and a handful
of Afghan guards and cooks who ran the prison, said several
current and former military and intelligence officers.
The CIA wanted the Salt Pit to be a "host-nation facility," an
Afghan prison with Afghan guards. Its designation as an Afghan
facility was intended to give U.S. personnel some insulation from
actions taken by Afghan guards inside, a tactic used in secret
CIA prisons in other countries, former and current CIA officials
said.
The CIA, however, paid the entire cost of maintaining the
facility, including the electricity, food and salaries for the
guards, who were all vetted by agency personnel. The CIA also
decided who would be kept inside, including some "high-value
targets," senior al Qaeda leaders in transit to other, more
secure secret CIA prisons.
In spring 2004, when the CIA first referred the Salt Pit case
to the Justice Department for possible prosecution, the
department cited the prison's status as a foreign facility,
outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. government, as one reason
for declining to prosecute, U.S. government officials aware of
the decision said.
The case officer who was put in charge of the Salt Pit was on
his first assignment. Described by colleagues as "bright and
eager" and "full of energy," he was the kind of person the agency
needed for such a dismal job. The officer was working undercover,
and his name could not be learned.
"A first-tour officer was put in charge because there were not
enough senior-level volunteers," said one intelligence officer
familiar with the case. "It's not a job just anyone would want.
More senior people said, 'I don't want to do that.' There was a
real notable absence of high-ranking people" in Afghanistan.
Besides, the intelligence officer said, "the CIA did not have
a deep cadre of people who knew how to run prisons. It was a new
discipline. There's a lot of room to get in trouble."
Shortly after the death, the CIA briefed the chairmen and vice
chairmen of the House and Senate intelligence committees, the
only four people in Congress whom the CIA has decided to
routinely brief on detainee and interrogation issues. But, one
official said, the briefing was not complete.
The Afghan detainee had been captured in Pakistan along with a
group of other Afghans. His connection to al Qaeda or the value
of his intelligence was never established before he died. "He was
probably associated with people who were associated with al
Qaeda," one U.S. government official said.
The brick factory has since been torn down, and the CIA has
built a facility somewhere else.
A team of federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of
Virginia recently convened to handle allegations of detainee
abuse is now taking a second look at the case.
The pace of the CIA investigations has tested the patience of
some in Congress, as was evident two weeks ago when Sen. Carl M.
Levin (D-Mich.), a member of the Senate intelligence panel, asked
CIA Director Porter J. Goss when the inspector general's inquiry
would be complete and available to the oversight committees.
"I haven't asked him what day he's going to finish all these
cases," Goss replied.
"Or a month?" shot back Levin.
"As soon as they are through," Goss answered. ". . . I know
there is still a bunch of other cases."
In recent weeks, the ranking Democrats on the House and Senate
intelligence panels have asked their Republican chairmen to
investigate the CIA's detention and interrogations. Sen. Pat
Roberts (R-Kan.) has declined the request from Sen. John D.
Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.).
The CIA inspector general, meanwhile, recently completed a
review of detention procedures in Afghanistan and Iraq and gave
Goss 10 recommendations for improving administrative procedures
for holding, moving and interrogating prisoners. The
recommendations included more detailed reporting requirements
from the field, increased safeguards against abuse and including
more CIA officials in decisions affecting interrogation
tactics.
Two have been fully adopted, officials said.
Researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.
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