Excerpts from material in secret Downing Street memos written in 2002. The information, authenticated by a senior British government official, was transcribed from the original documents./P>

In a memo dated March 14, 2002, Tony Blair's chief foreign policy adviser, David Manning, tells the prime minister about a dinner he had with US national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, who is now secretary of state. Manning is now the British ambassador to the United States.

"Condi's enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed. But there were some signs, since we last spoke, of greater awareness of the practical difficulties and political risks. . . . From what she said, Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions: How to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and justified; What value to put on the exiled Iraqi opposition; How to coordinate a US/allied military campaign with internal opposition; (assuming there is any); What happens on the morning after?"

From a memo dated March 22, 2002 from Peter Ricketts, British foreign office political director, to Jack Straw, Britain's foreign secretary, on advice given on Iraq to Blair.

"US scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al Qaida is so far frankly unconvincing. To get public and Parliamentary support for military operations, we have to be convincing that the threat is so serious/imminent that it is worth sending out troops to die for; it is qualitatively different from the threat posed by other proliferators who are closer to achieving nuclear capability (including Iran)."

"The second problem is the END STATE. Military operations need clear and compelling military objectives. For Kosovo, it was: Serbs out, Kosovars back, peace-keepers in. For Afghanistan, destroying the Taliban and Al Qaida military capability. For Iraq, "regime change" does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge between Bush and Saddam."

From a briefing paper dated July 21, 2002, given to Blair and government officials before meeting on July 23, 2002, about Iraq:

"Even with a legal base and viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks. In particular we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective. . . . A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more precisely the means by which the desired end state would be created, in particular what form of government might replace Saddam Hussein's regime and the time scale within which it would be possible to identify a successor."

From minutes of a July 23, 2002, meeting between Blair and top government officials. "C" refers to Sir Richard Dearlove, then chief of Britain's intelligence service.

"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude (about Iraq). Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action." © Copyright 2005 Globe Newspaper Company.

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