Feith: Administration Overdid
WMD Claims
YahooNews/AP
By ROBERT BURNS
AP Military Writer
Fri Jul 15, 7:10 AM ET
WASHINGTON - The top policy adviser to Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld says the Bush administration erred by building
its public case for war against Saddam Hussein mainly on the
claim that he possessed banned weapons.
The comment by Douglas J. Feith, in an interview with The
Associated Press, is a rare admission of error about Iraq by a
senior administration official. Feith, who is leaving after four
years as the undersecretary of defense for policy, said he
remains convinced that President Bush was correct in deciding
that war against Iraq was necessary.
"I don't think there is any question that we as an
administration, instead of giving proper emphasis to all major
elements of the rationale for war, overemphasized the WMD
aspect," he said, using the abbreviation for weapons of mass
destruction.
The administration claimed the now-deposed Iraqi president
possessed mass-killing chemical and biological weapons at the
time of the March 2003 invasion and cited them most prominently
as justification for attacking.
No such weapons have been found. In March, a bipartisan
presidential commission said U.S. spy agencies were "dead wrong"
in most of their prewar assessments about Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction.
One of the architects of the administration's strategy for the
war on terror, Feith strongly defended the decision to invade
Iraq.
"It would have been better had we done a better job of
communicating in all of its breadth the strategic rationale for
the war," Feith said in an hour-long interview this week at his
home in suburban Washington.
The broader rationale, Feith said, included the danger posed
by Iraq's potential to resume building chemical, biological and
possibly nuclear weapons — know-how that the Iraqi regime
developed before the 1991Gulf War.
In his report to Congress on a CIA-led postwar search for
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, U.S. arms inspector Charles
Duelfer said none could be found and there was no evidence Saddam
produced any after 1991. But Duelfer also said it was clear that
Saddam hoped to revive his weapons programs if U.N. sanctions
were lifted.
"Our intelligence community made, apparently, an error, as to
the stockpiles" of weapons it assured President Bush existed in
2003, Feith said. Thus that part of the administration's argument
for why war was necessary was overdone, he said, adding,
"Anything we said at all about stockpiles was overemphasis, given
that we didn't find them."
Feith has been accused by critics of having manipulated
intelligence on Iraq to push the case for war, an accusation he
vehemently denies. His chief critic in Congress on this point is
Sen. Carl Levin (news, bio, voting record), D-Mich., who is
delaying Senate confirmation of Feith's replacement, Eric
Edelman, a former ambassador to Turkey, by demanding the Pentagon
produce more documents on the intelligence controversy.
Feith said he is irritated by the assertions of administration
critics that the absence of WMD stockpiles in Iraq negates the
rationale for going to war. They ignore the broader reasoning, he
said, which included the dangers posed by Saddam's record of
aggression against Kuwait, hostility toward the United States, a
"rhetorical and financial support" for terrorism and a weakening
of the world's resolve to contain his ambitions.
"One could fault the administration on the presentation of the
rationale, but that is different from saying the rationale was
actually extremely narrow and invalidated by the disclosure of
the error" on WMD stockpiles, he said.
Another element of the administration's reasoning was a
belief, still held, that if the tyrannical regime in Baghdad
could be replaced with democratic institutions, it could have a
beneficial effect in transforming the politics of the Middle
East. That alone, however, was not a sufficient reason to go to
war, Feith said.
"Had Saddam Hussein not been a supporter of terrorism and a
guy who developed and used WMD, I don't think that simply saying
he's a tyrant and we have a chance to replace a tyrant would have
motivated the war," he said.
Feith, who served in the White House and at the Pentagon
during the administration of President Reagan, said one of his
most important contributions during his four years working for
Rumsfeld was helping break down communication and cultural
barriers between Pentagon civilian and military officials.
By working closely with Gen. Peter Pace, the vice chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and exposing scores of staff members
to their example of cooperation and collegiality, the "great
divide" between the civilian and military policy organizations
and their "clash of memoranda" has been largely overcome, Feith
said.
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