Blix: No Evidence Of Iraqi
WMD
UN
Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC
Dr. Hans Blix
February 14, 2003
Introduction
Mr. President,
Since I reported to the Security Council on 27 January,
UNMOVIC has had two further weeks of operational and analytical
work in New York and active inspections in Iraq. This brings the
total period of inspections so far to 11 weeks. Since then, we
have also listened on 5 February to the presentation to the
Council by the US Secretary of State and the discussion that
followed. Lastly, Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of
talks in Baghdad with our counterparts and with Vice President
Ramadan on 8 and 9 February.
Work in Iraq
Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the work
being performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.
We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional
office in Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary
headquarters. Plans for a regional office at Basra are being
developed. Our Hercules L-100 aircraft continues to operate
routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight
helicopters are fully operational. With the resolution of the
problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of minders into
the no-fly zones, our mobility in these zones has improved. We
expect to increase utilization of the helicopters. The number of
Iraqi minders during inspections had often reached a ratio as
high as five per inspector. During the talks in January in
Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about one to
one. The situation has improved.
Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400
inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were
performed without notice, and access was almost always provided
promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the
Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming.
The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial
sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities,
presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile
production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites. At
all sites which had been inspected before 1998, re-baselining
activities were performed. This included the identification of
the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a
site. It also included verification of previously tagged
equipment, application of seals and tags, taking samples and
discussions with the site personnel regarding past and present
activities. At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used
to look for underground structures or buried equipment.
Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a
good knowledge of the industrial and scientific landscape of
Iraq, as well as of its missile capability but, as before, we do
not know every cave and corner. Inspections are effectively
helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the
absence of inspections between December 1998 and November
2002.
More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples
have been collected at different sites. Three-quarters of these
have been screened using our own analytical laboratory
capabilities at the Baghdad Centre (BOMVIC). The results to date
have been consistent with Iraq's declarations.
We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately
50 litres of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being kept
under UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site. One-third of the
quantity has already been destroyed. The laboratory quantity of
thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which we found at another
site, has also been destroyed.
The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60
countries. This includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 15 IAEA
inspectors, 50 aircrew, and 65 support staff.
Mr. President,
In my 27 January update to the Council, I said that it seemed
from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide
cooperation on process, most importantly prompt access to all
sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the
necessary infrastructure. This impression remains, and we note
that access to sites has so far been without problems, including
those that had never been declared or inspected, as well as to
Presidential sites and private residences.
In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate
on substance was indispensable in order to bring, through
inspection, the disarmament task to completion and to set the
monitoring system on a firm course. Such cooperation, as I have
noted, requires more than the opening of doors. In the words of
resolution 1441 (2002) - it requires immediate, unconditional and
active efforts by Iraq to resolve existing questions of
disarmament - either by presenting remaining proscribed items and
programmes for elimination or by presenting convincing evidence
that they have been eliminated. In the current situation, one
would expect Iraq to be eager to comply. While we were in
Baghdad, we met a delegation from the Government of South Africa.
It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence of
the world in its dismantling of the nuclear weapons programme, by
a wholehearted cooperation over two years with IAEA inspectors. I
have just learned that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa
to send a group of experts for further talks.
How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction and related proscribed items and programmes? So
far, UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number
of empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared and
destroyed. Another matter - and one of great significance
- is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted
for. To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided,
suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were
"unaccounted for". One must not jump to the conclusion that they
exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they
exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not
exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented.
We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence
organizations are convinced and assert that proscribed weapons,
items and programmes continue to exist. The US Secretary of State
presented material in support of this conclusion. Governments
have many sources of information that are not available to
inspectors. Inspectors, for their part, must base their reports
only on evidence, which they can, themselves, examine and present
publicly. Without evidence, confidence cannot arise.
Mr. President,
In my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant
outstanding issues of substance were listed in two Security
Council documents from early 1999 (S/1999/94 and S/1999/356) and
should be well known to Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the
issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and long-range missiles,
and said that such issues "deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq
rather than being brushed aside…". The declaration
submitted by Iraq on 7 December last year, despite its large
volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and
evidence needed to respond to the open questions. This is perhaps
the most important problem we are facing. Although I can
understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to
provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors
to find it. Iraq itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid
belittling the questions.
Work in New York
In my January update to the Council, I referred to the Al
Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting
chambers, construction of a missile engine test stand and the
import of rocket engines, which were all declared to UNMOVIC by
Iraq. I noted that the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah could very
well represent prima facie cases of proscribed missile systems,
as they had been tested to ranges exceeding the 150-kilometre
limit set by the Security Council. I also noted that Iraq had
been requested to cease flight tests of these missiles until
UNMOVIC completed a technical review.
Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days
with experts from a number of Member States to discuss these
items. The experts concluded unanimously that, based on the data
provided by Iraq, the two declared variants of the Al Samoud 2
missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range. This
missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to
resolution 687 (1991) and the monitoring plan adopted by
resolution 715 (1991).
As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of
the missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the
capability of the missile system could be fully assessed.
With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following:
UNSCOM ordered and supervised the destruction of the casting
chambers, which had been intended for use in the production of
the proscribed Badr-2000 missile system. Iraq has declared that
it has reconstituted these chambers. The experts have confirmed
that the reconstituted casting chambers could still be used to
produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly
greater than 150 kilometres. Accordingly, these chambers remain
proscribed.
The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test
stand that is nearing completion and have assessed it to be
capable of testing missile engines with thrusts greater than that
of the SA-2 engine. So far, the test stand has not been
associated with a proscribed activity.
On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside
of the export/import mechanism and in contravention of paragraph
24 of resolution 687 (1991), UNMOVIC inspectors were informed by
Iraq during an official briefing that these engines were intended
for use in the Al Samoud 2 missile system, which has now been
assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines configured for use in
this missile system would also be proscribed.
I intend to communicate these findings to the Government of
Iraq.
Meeting in Baghdad
At the meeting in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February, the Iraqi side
addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues
and gave us a number of papers, e.g. regarding anthrax and growth
material, the nerve agent VX and missile production. Experts who
were present from our side studied the papers during the evening
of 8 February and met with Iraqi experts in the morning of 9
February for further clarifications. Although no new evidence was
provided in the papers and no open issues were closed through
them or the expert discussions, the presentation of the papers
could be indicative of a more active attitude focusing on
important open issues.
The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the
quantities of anthrax and two VX-precursors, which had been
declared unilaterally destroyed, might be tackled through certain
technical and analytical methods. Although our experts are still
assessing the suggestions, they are not very hopeful that it
could prove possible to assess the quantities of material poured
into the ground years ago. Documentary evidence and testimony by
staff that dealt with the items still appears to be needed.
Not least against this background, a letter of 12 February
from Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate may be of relevance.
It presents a list of 83 names of participants "in the unilateral
destruction in the chemical field, which took place in the summer
of 1991". As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction
has been and remains an important reason why quantities of
chemicals have been deemed "unaccounted for", the presentation of
a list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions
appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance. I trust
that the Iraqi side will put together a similar list of names of
persons who participated in the unilateral destruction of other
proscribed items, notably in the biological field.
The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had
been appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical
weapons warheads, had had its mandate expanded to look for any
still existing proscribed items. This was welcomed.
A second commission, we learnt, has now been appointed with
the task of searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant
to the elimination of proscribed items and programmes. It is
headed by the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is
to have very extensive powers of search in industry,
administration and even private houses.
The two commissions could be useful tools to come up with
proscribed items to be destroyed and with new documentary
evidence. They evidently need to work fast and effectively to
convince us, and the world, that it is a serious effort.
The matter of private interviews was discussed at length
during our meeting in Baghdad. The Iraqi side confirmed the
commitment, which it made to us on 20 January, to encourage
persons asked to accept such interviews, whether in or out of
Iraq. So far, we have only had interviews in Baghdad. A number of
persons have declined to be interviewed, unless they were allowed
to have an official present or were allowed to tape the
interview. Three persons that had previously refused interviews
on UNMOVIC's terms, subsequently accepted such interviews just
prior to our talks in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February. These
interviews proved informative. No further interviews have since
been accepted on our terms. I hope this will change. We feel that
interviews conducted without any third party present and without
tape recording would provide the greatest credibility.
At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as on several earlier
occasions, my colleague Dr. ElBaradei and I have urged the Iraqi
side to enact legislation implementing the UN prohibitions
regarding weapons of mass destruction. This morning we had a
message that a Presidential decree has now been issued containing
prohibitions with regard to importation and production of
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. We have not yet had
time to study the details of the text of the decree.
Intelligence
Mr. President, I should like to make some comments on the role
of intelligence in connection with inspections in Iraq.
A credible inspection regime requires that Iraq provide full
cooperation on "process" - granting immediate access everywhere
to inspectors - and on substance, providing full declarations
supported by relevant information and material and evidence.
However, with the closed society in Iraq of today and the history
of inspections there, other sources of information, such as
defectors and government intelligence agencies are required to
aid the inspection process.
I remember myself how, in 1991, several inspections in Iraq,
which were based on information received from a Government,
helped to disclose important parts of the nuclear weapons
programme. It was realized that an international organization
authorized to perform inspections anywhere on the ground could
make good use of information obtained from governments with eyes
in the sky, ears in the ether, access to defectors, and both eyes
and ears on the market for weapons-related material. It was
understood that the information residing in the intelligence
services of governments could come to very active use in the
international effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. This remains true and we have by now a good deal of
experience in the matter.
International organizations need to analyse such information
critically and especially benefit when it comes from more than
one source. The intelligence agencies, for their part, must
protect their sources and methods. Those who provide such
information must know that it will be kept in strict confidence
and be known to very few people. UNMOVIC has achieved good
working relations with intelligence agencies and the amount of
information provided has been gradually increasing. However, we
must recognize that there are limitations and that
misinterpretation can occur.
Intelligence information has been useful for UNMOVIC. In one
case, it led us to a private home where documents mainly relating
to laser enrichment of uranium were found. In other cases,
intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items were
found. Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites
were useful in proving the absence of such items and in some
cases the presence of other items - conventional munitions. It
showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country
and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass
destruction.
The presentation of intelligence information by the US
Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had prepared for
inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of
proscribed weapons programmes. I would like to comment only on
one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks
identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a
munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly
one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have
noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken
several weeks apart. The reported movement of munitions at the
site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a
movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent
inspection. Our reservation on this point does not detract from
our appreciation of the briefing.
Plans for the immediate future
Yesterday, UNMOVIC informed the Iraqi authorities of its
intention to start using the U-2 surveillance aircraft early next
week under arrangements similar to those UNSCOM had followed. We
are also in the process of working out modalities for the use of
the French Mirage aircraft starting late next week and for the
drones supplied by the German Government. The offer from Russia
of an Antonov aircraft, with night vision capabilities, is a
welcome one and is next on our agenda for further improving
UNMOVIC's and IAEA's technical capabilities. These developments
are in line with suggestions made in a non-paper recently
circulated by France, suggesting a further strengthening of the
inspection capabilities.
It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying
ground movements, notably by trucks. In the face of persistent
intelligence reports for instance about mobile biological weapons
production units, such measures could well increase the
effectiveness of inspections.
UNMOVIC is still expanding its capabilities, both in terms of
numbers of staff and technical resources. On my way to the recent
Baghdad meeting, I stopped in Vienna to meet 60 experts, who had
just completed our general training course for inspectors. They
came from 22 countries, including Arab countries.
Time lines
Mr. President,
UNMOVIC is not infrequently asked how much more time it needs
to complete its task in Iraq. The answer depends upon which task
one has in mind - the elimination of weapons of mass destruction
and related items and programmes, which were prohibited in 1991 -
the disarmament task - or the monitoring that no new proscribed
activities occur. The latter task, though not often focused upon,
is highly significant - and not controversial. It will require
monitoring, which is "ongoing", that is, open-ended until the
Council decides otherwise.
By contrast, the task of "disarmament" foreseen in resolution
687 (1991) and the progress on "key remaining disarmament tasks"
foreseen in resolution 1284 (1999) as well as the "disarmament
obligations", which Iraq was given a "final opportunity to comply
with" under resolution 1441 (2002), were always required to be
fulfilled in a shorter time span. Regrettably, the high degree of
cooperation required of Iraq for disarmament through inspection
was not forthcoming in 1991. Despite the elimination, under
UNSCOM and IAEA supervision, of large amounts of weapons,
weapons-related items and installations over the years, the task
remained incomplete, when inspectors were withdrawn almost 8
years later at the end of 1998.
If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the
phase of disarmament - under resolution 687 (1991) - could have
been short and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided.
Today, three months after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002),
the period of disarmament through inspection could still be
short, if "immediate, active and unconditional cooperation" with
UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be forthcoming.
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