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Statements by UN Chief
Inspectors
United Nations News
Security Council
4692nd Meeting (AM)
27/01/2003
The meeting began at 10:40 a.m. and was adjourned at 11:36
a.m.
HANS BLIX, Executive Chairman of the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),
cited the three important questions before the Council today: how
much in the way of prohibited weapons and related materials might
remain undeclared and intact from the period prior to 1991, and,
possibly thereafter; what, if anything, was illegally produced or
procured after 1998, when the inspectors left; and how to prevent
the production or procurement of any weapons of mass destruction
in the future.
He said that resolution 1441 (2002) emphatically reaffirmed
the demand on Iraq to cooperate. Indeed, it required that
cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active. The
resolution contained many provisions, which were welcomed as
enhancing and strengthening the inspection regime. The unanimity
with which it was adopted had sent a powerful signal that the
Council was "of one mind" in creating a last
opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through
inspection.
The UNMOVIC shared the sense of urgency felt by the Council to
use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable time,
verifiable disarmament of Iraq, he said. Under the relevant
resolutions, that would be followed by monitoring for such time
as the Council felt would be required. The resolutions also
pointed to a zone free of mass destruction weapons as the
ultimate goal. The UNMOVIC was fully aware of and appreciated the
close attention, which the Council devoted to the inspections in
Iraq. While today's "updating" was foreseen in
resolution 1441 (2002), the Council could and did call for
additional briefings whenever it wished. One was held on 19
January and a further one was tentatively set for 14
February.
Turning to the key requirement of cooperation and
Iraq's response to it, he said that cooperation might be
said to relate to both substance and process. It would appear
from his experience so far that Iraq had decided in principle to
provide cooperation on substance, in order to bring the
disarmament task to completion through the peaceful process of
inspection and to bring the monitoring task on a firm course. An
initial minor step would be to adopt the long overdue legislation
required by the resolutions. Concerning cooperation on process,
"Iraq has, on the whole, cooperated rather well so far with
UNMOVIC in this field", he said. Access had been provided
to all sites he had wanted to inspect and, with one exception,
that had been prompt.
Two problems he said he wished to register related to two
kinds of air operations. Iraq had refused to guarantee the safety
of a U-2 plane placed at UNMOVIC's disposal for aerial
imagery and surveillance, unless a number of conditions were
fulfilled. As those conditions went beyond the stipulations in
resolution 1441 (2002) and what had been practised by the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and Iraq in the past, he
noted that Iraq was not so far complying with that request.
Another air operation problem concerned the use of helicopters
flying into the no-fly zones. Iraq had insisted on sending
helicopters of its own to accompany UNMOVIC's, but as that
would have raised a safety problem, the matter was solved by an
offer on UNMOVIC's party to take the accompanying Iraq
minders in the inspectors' helicopters to the sites.
There had been some recent disturbing incidents and
harassment, he continued. For instance, some far-fetched
allegations had been made publicly that questions posed by
inspectors were of an intelligence character. Iraq knew that the
inspectors did not serve intelligence purposes, and Iraq should
not say so. On a number of occasions, demonstrations had taken
place in front of UNMOVIC's offices and at inspection
sites. Those did not facilitate an already difficult job, in
which the inspectors tried to be effective, professional and, at
the same time, correct.
Discussing cooperation on substance, Dr. Blix referred to the
12,000-page declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December 2002. In
the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration
contained a "good deal" of new material and
information covering the period from 1998 and onward. That had
been welcome. One might have expected that in preparing the
declaration, Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify and
submit supporting evidence regarding many of the open disarmament
issues. Among them –- UNSCOM document S/1999/94 of January
1999 and the so-called "Amorim Report" of March 1999
(document S/1999/356) -– were questions which UNMOVIC,
governments and independent commentators had often cited.
He said those reports did not contend that weapons of mass
destruction remained in Iraq, but nor did they exclude that
possibility. They pointed to lack of evidence and
inconsistencies, which raised question marks that must be
straightened out if the weapons dossiers were to be closed and
confidence was to arise. Regrettably, Iraq's declaration
did not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the
questions or reduce their number.
Turning to some examples of outstanding issues and questions,
he began with chemical weapons. The nerve agent VX, he said, was
one of the most toxic ever developed. Iraq had declared that it
had only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes, and
that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently,
it said, that agent had never been weaponized. Iraq had said that
the small quantity of the agent remaining after the Gulf War had
been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. The UNMOVIC,
however, had information that conflicted with that account. There
were indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity
and stabilization and that more had been achieved than had been
declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq
indicated that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory
production, was higher than declared. There were also indications
that the agent was weaponized.
On the so-called "Air Force document", found by an
UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in
1998 and providing an account of the expenditures of bombs,
including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war, he was
encouraged by the fact that Iraq had now provided that document
to UNMOVIC. The document indicated that 13,000 chemical bombs
were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while
Iraq had declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during that
period. Thus, there was a discrepancy on the order of about 1,000
tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he must
assume that those quantities were now unaccounted for.
Regarding the discovery of a number of 122 millimetre chemical
rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot south-west of
Baghdad, he said that that was a relatively new bunker and,
therefore, the rockets must have been moved there in the past few
years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions.
The investigation of those rockets was still proceeding. Their
discovery did not resolve, but rather pointed to the issue of
several thousands of chemical rockets that were unaccounted for.
Their finding showed that Iraq needed to make more effort to
ensure that its declaration was currently accurate. Inspectors
had also found, at another site, a laboratory quantity of
thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.
On biological weapons, he recalled that Iraq had produced
about 8,500 litres of anthrax, a biological warfare agent, which
it stated it had unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.
Iraq had provided little evidence for that production and no
convincing evidence for its destruction. There were strong
indications that Iraq had produced more anthrax than it had
declared and that at least some of that had been retained after
the declared destruction date. That might still exist. Either it
should be found and destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision, or
convincing evidence should be produced to show that it had been
destroyed in 1991. Also, Iraq had not declared a significant
quantity of bacterial growth media, which had been acknowledged
as imported in Iraq. The quantity of media involved would suffice
to produce about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax, he
said.
Concerning missiles, there remained significant questions as
to whether Iraq had retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf
War, he went in. Iraq had declared the consumption of a number of
SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic
missile defence system during the 1980s, yet no technical
information had been produced about that programme or data on the
consumption of missiles. There had been a range of developments
in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq
as non-proscribed activities. The inspectors were trying to gain
a clear understanding of them. Meanwhile, Iraq had been asked to
cease flight tests of two missile systems. It had refurbished its
missile production infrastructure; in particular, it had
reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had been
destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Whatever missile system those
chambers were intended for, they could produce motors for
missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150
kilometres, Mr. Blix said.
Also associated with missile development had been the import
of a number of items, despite the sanctions, he said. Foremost
among them was the import of 380 rocket engines for the Al Samoud
2, a liquid-fuelled missile. Iraq had also declared the recent
import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and
guidance and control systems. Those items might well be for
proscribed purposes, but that was yet to be determined. What was
clear was that they were illegally brought into Iraq, indicating
that Iraq, or some company in Iraq, had circumvented the
restrictions imposed by various resolutions. He emphasized the
presumptions did not solve the problem; evidence and full
transparency might help.
Specifically, he said that information provided by Member
States about the movement and concealment of missiles and
chemical weapons and mobile units for biological weapons
production would certainly be followed up. On the question of
documents, he said that when he had urged Iraq to present more
evidence, the response had often been that there were no more
documents. The recent inspecting finding in the private home of a
scientist of a box of 3,000 pages of documents, much of it
related to the laser enrichment of uranium, supported a long-held
concern that documents might be distributed to the homes of
private individuals. The Iraqi side, however, claimed that
research staff sometimes brought home papers from their work
places. He could not help but think that that case might not be
isolated, and that such placements of documents was deliberate to
make discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents.
He said that when Iraq claimed that tangible evidence in the
form of documents was not available, it ought, at least, to find
individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify about
their experience. Some 400 names for all biological and chemical
weapons programmes, as well as their missile programmes, had been
provided by the Iraqi side. That could be compared to more than
3,500 names of people associated with those past weapons
programmes that UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew
from documents and other sources. At his recent meeting in
Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to supplementing the
list, and some 80 additional names had been provided.
In the past, much valuable information had come from
interviews, he said. To date, 11 individuals had been asked for
interviews in Baghdad. The replies had invariably been that the
individual would only speak at Iraq's monitoring
directorate or in the presence of an Iraqi official. At his
recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to
encourage persons to accept interviews "in private".
Despite that, the pattern had not changed. He hoped that further
encouragement from the authorities would permit knowledgeable
individuals to accept private interviews, in Baghdad or
abroad.
On UNMOVIC's capability, he said that in the past two
months UNMOVIC had built up its capabilities from nothing to 260
staff members from 60 countries. Furthermore, the roster of
inspectors would grow as the training programmes continued. In
the past two months, the inspectors had conducted about 300
inspections to more than 230 different sites. Of those, more than
20 had not been inspected before. By the end of December, UNMOVIC
began using helicopters, both for the transport of inspectors and
for actual inspection work. Those had already proved invaluable
in helping to "freeze" large sites by observing the
movement of traffic in and around the area. Setting up a field
office in Mosul had facilitated rapid inspections of sites in
northern Iraq. Plans were under way to establish soon a second
field office in the Basra area.
MOHAMED ELBARADEI, Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), began by recalling
what had been accomplished during inspections from 1991 to 1998.
The Agency's conclusion at that time was that Iraq's
nuclear weapons programme had been neutralized, and there was no
indication that Iraq had retained any physical capability to
produce weapon-usable nuclear material. During the intervening
four years of the Agency's absence from Iraq, the IAEA had
continued its analytical work to the best of its ability, using
satellite imagery and other information. But no remote analysis
could replace on-site inspections, and the Agency was, therefore,
not able to reach any conclusions about Iraq's compliance
with its Council obligations in the nuclear field after December
1998.
Against that backdrop, he continued, when Iraq agreed last
September to reopen its doors to inspection, and following the
adoption of resolution 1441, which strengthened the IAEA's
authority and the inspection process, the first goal of the
inspection activities was "reconnaissance". In that
phase, the Agency sought to re-establish rapidly its knowledge
base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, to ensure that key
facilities had not been reopened, to verify the location of
nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material, and to
identify and begin interviewing key Iraqi personnel.
Over the first two months of inspection, good progress had
been made in the Agency's knowledge of Iraq's nuclear
capabilities, with a total of 139 inspections at some 106
locations to date, he said. The bulk of those inspections had
taken place at State-run or private industrial facilities,
research centres and universities -– either at locations
where Iraq's significant technical capabilities were known
to have existed in the past, or at new locations suggested by
remote monitoring and analysis. All inspection activities had
been carried out without prior notification to Iraq, except where
notification was needed to ensure the availability of required
support. IAEA inspections had taken –- and would continue
to take –- full advantage of the inspection authority
granted by resolution 1441. In doing so, the inspectors had been
instructed to make every effort to conduct their activities with
appropriate professionalism and sensitivity.
While the Agency was continuing to some extent with that
reconnaissance work, he said, inspections were now well into the
"investigative" phase, with particular emphasis on
determining what, if anything, had occurred in Iraq over the past
four years relevant to the re-establishment of nuclear
capabilities. Those investigative inspections focused on areas of
concern identified by other States, facilities identified through
satellite imagery as having been modified or constructed since
1998, and other inspections leads identified independently by the
IAEA.
In parallel with those inspection activities, the IAEA had
been conducting exhaustive analysis of supporting information
obtained from various sources, he said. In that context, it had
integrated the new information submitted by Iraq –-
including its recent declaration -– with the records that
had been accumulated between 1991 and 1998 and the additional
information that had been compiled through remote monitoring
since 1998. The Iraqi declaration was consistent with the
Agency's existing understanding of Iraq's pre-1991
nuclear programme. However, it did not provide any new
information relevant to certain questions that had been
outstanding since 1998 –- in particular, regarding
Iraq's progress prior to 1991 related to weapons design and
centrifuge development. While those questions did not constitute
unresolved disarmament issues, they nevertheless needed further
clarification.
In addition to on-site inspections and off-site analysis, IAEA
inspectors had employed a variety of tools to accomplish their
mission, he noted. Taking advantage of the
"signature" of radioactive materials, the Agency had
resumed the monitoring of Iraq's rivers, canals and lakes
to detect the presence of certain radioisotopes. A broad variety
of environmental samples and surface swipe samples had been
collected from locations across Iraq and taken to IAEA
laboratories for analysis.
The inspectors had also conducted a great number of interviews
of Iraqi scientists, managers and technicians -– primarily
in the workplace in the course of unannounced inspections
-– as a valuable source of information about past and
present programmes and activities. The information gained had
been helpful in assessing the completeness and accuracy of
Iraq's declarations. Resolution 1441 also clearly gave to
the IAEA and UNMOVIC the authority to determine the modalities
and venues for conducting interviews with Iraqi officials and
other persons. The first two individuals whom the IAEA requested
to see privately had declined to be interviewed without the
presence of an Iraqi government representative. That had been a
restricting factor.
Although the Iraqi Government recently had committed itself to
encouraging Iraqi officials and other personnel to be interviewed
in private when requested, regrettably, the third request, two
days ago, for a private interview was again turned down by the
interviewee, he said. The IAEA would continue to determine the
modalities and locations of the interviews, including the
possibility of interviewing Iraqi personnel abroad. He would
continue to report to the Council on the Agency's efforts
to conduct interviews according to the Agency's preferred
modalities and venues, and its degree of success in that
regard.
He then summarized some of the findings thus far from the
inspection activities. First, the Agency had inspected all of
those buildings and facilities that had been identified, through
satellite imagery, as having been modified or constructed over
the past four years. IAEA inspectors had been able to gain ready
access and to clarify the nature of the activities currently
being conducted in those facilities. No prohibited nuclear
activities had been identified during those inspections.
A particular issue of focus, he noted, had been the attempted
procurement by Iraq of high strength aluminium tubes, and the
question of whether those tubes, if acquired, could be used for
the manufacture of nuclear centrifuges. Iraqi authorities had
indicated that their unsuccessful attempts to procure the
aluminium tubes related to a programme to reverse engineer
conventional rockets. To verify that information, IAEA inspectors
had inspected the relevant rocket production and storage sites,
taken tube samples, interviewed relevant Iraqi personnel, and
reviewed procurement contracts and related documents.
From the Agency's analysis to date, it
appeared that the aluminium tubes would be consistent with the
purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be
suitable for manufacturing centrifuges. However, he said the
inspectors were still investigating that issue. It was clear,
however, that the attempt to acquire such tubes was prohibited
under Council resolution 687.
Another area of focus, he said, had been to determine how
certain other "dual use" materials had been relocated
or used –- that was, materials that could be used in
nuclear weapons production but also have other legitimate uses. A
fourth focal point had been the investigation of reports of Iraqi
efforts to import uranium after 1991. The Iraqi authorities had
denied any such attempts. The IAEA would continue to pursue that
issue. Currently, however, it did not have enough information,
and he would appreciate receiving more. He was also making
progress on a number of other issues related, for example, to the
attempted importation of a magnet production facility.
Over the next several months, inspections would focus ever
more closely on follow-up of specific concerns, as the Agency
continued to conduct visits to sites and interviews with key
Iraqi personnel. It had begun helicopter operations, which
increased the inspectors' mobility and their ability to
respond rapidly to new information, and allow wide-scale
radiation detection surveys. Laboratory analysis of environmental
samplers was continuing, and the Agency would be re-installing
air samplers for wide-area environmental monitoring. The Agency
would also re-introduce surveillance systems with video cameras
in key locations to allow near-real-time remote monitoring of
dual-use equipment.
He had begun in the last few weeks to receive more information
from States of direct and current value for inspection follow-up.
He continued to call on States that had access to such
information to provide it to the inspecting organizations, so
that the inspection process could be accelerated and additional
assurances could be generated.
He had urged Iraq, once again, to increase the degree of its
cooperation with the inspection process. In support of the IAEA
inspections to date, the Iraqi authorities had provided access to
all facilities visited -– including presidential compounds
and private residences -– without conditions and without
delay. The Iraqi authorities had also been cooperative in making
available additional original documentation, in response to
requests by IAEA inspectors. In his discussions with Iraqi
officials last week in Baghdad, he emphasized the need to shift
from passive support –- that is, responding as needed to
inspectors' requests –- to proactive support –-
that is, voluntarily assisting inspectors by providing
documentation, people and other evidence that would assist in
filling the remaining gaps in the Agency's information.
The proactive engagement on the part of Iraq would be in its
own best interest and was a window of opportunity that might not
remain open for very much longer, he said. Iraq should make every
effort to be fully transparent -– with a demonstrated
willingness to resolve issues rather than requiring pressure to
do so. The international community would not be satisfied when
questions remained open regarding Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. The world was asking for a high level of assurance
that Iraq was completely free from all such weapons, and was
already impatient to receive it. The sooner such assistance could
be provided by the inspecting organizations, the sooner the
prospects of a peaceful resolution would translate into a
plausible reality. Inspections were time-consuming, but if
successful, could ensure disarmament through peaceful means. The
presence of inspectors today continued to serve as an effective
deterrent to and insurance against resumption of programmes to
develop weapons of mass destructions, even as he continued to
look for possible past activities.
To date, the Agency had found no evidence that
Iraq had revived its nuclear weapons programme since the
elimination of the programme in the 1990s, he stated. However,
the Agency's work was steadily progressing and should be
allowed to run its natural course. "With our verification
system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and
provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we
should be able, within the next few months, to provide credible
assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. These few
months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could
help us avoid a war."
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