|
The Budget Process is
dead-CBO
cbo.gov
by Dan L. Crippen- of CBO
"Observations on the Current State of the Federal
Budget Process"
Good afternoon. I am going to start by saying that I never say
anything very profound, and I'm not likely to break that record
today. I say that because what I'm about to say is probably not
very surprising, but, nonetheless, I think it needs to be said.
Namely, from where I sit, at least, the Congressional budget
process is dead. One might say, "Long live the budget process!"
But it is dead for all practical purposes at the moment. And
before I explain why I think that is the case and some of the
implications, I want to regale you or bore you with a few
highlights and "low lights" of the history of the budget process
as we have known it in the recent past.
I understand that a number of you are getting training credits
for this, so you will like the history lesson that you are
getting here, and you can say that it was a beautiful part of
your course work.
As most of you know, the Congressional budget process of the
modern era started with the Nixon impoundments. For those of you
who do not know, President Nixon chose not to spend certain
appropriations. Although he did not have a line-item veto, the
apportionment power, which the executive branch still has, was
used to essentially not spend some funds--effecting an
impoundment. The Congress, not surprisingly, was not particularly
pleased with that action so, among other things, it eventually
fashioned and passed the Budget and Impoundment Control Act,
which, in his closing days and weakened position, Nixon
signed.
So the modern budget process was created, not as an
afterthought but certainly as an ancillary thought to the driving
force of the legislation, which was to gather back to the
Congress some of the budgetary power that the President had
sought to claim as his own.
The Budget Act, which created the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) as well, provided for the Congress to have a much better
formulation of the budget in an overarching sense than it had
probably ever had. You are all familiar with 13 appropriation
bills' being passed and adding up the budget total at the end of
the year. Not much consideration was given, however, to exactly
what the effect of individual pieces of legislation was going to
be on the budget in any given year. But the Budget Act made
provision for a number of legislative vehicles, for lack of a
better term, that were to be employed to help the Congress be
more responsible in certain areas.
The law said that there should be a first budget resolution
early in the year, which would lay out the plan for the Congress
for the year. There was to be a second resolution a little later
in the year to accommodate significant changes in economic
outlook, fiscal needs, and the like. And at the end of the year,
if necessary, there was to be a reconciliation bill that would
conform the plan with what was at that point actuality or
reality. And that was how the process was supposed to go. It
almost never went that way. There were a number of years in which
there were a first budget resolution and a second and even a year
in which there was a reconciliation bill--roughly what the
framers of the law had in mind.
But starting in 1981, the Budget Act was basically turned on
its head. Specifically, there was a reconciliation bill, but it
followed shortly after the first budget resolution, which not
long thereafter became the second budget resolution as well. And
in 1981, reconciliation was used to implement a whole range of
policies, which affected taxes, entitlements, the jurisdiction of
authorizing committees, and the appropriation process in very
broad ways.
The first reconciliation bill, which was mostly aimed at
spending, if you will, had 59 subconferences between the House
and Senate. Resolving the differences between the two took almost
a month even though the bills were actually quite similar when
they passed in both Houses. It was later that year that the
equivalent of a second reconciliation bill (although we did not
call it that) implemented much of the tax policy of the Reagan
Administration, plus a lot of tax policy added by the Congress.
Then, ultimately, there was another budget resolution.
But the whole process had changed dramatically--from an
accounting system, a measure of responsibility, a guide for
spending to one of actually implementing a great deal of policy.
And that really remained the way the process worked for a number
of years. It was added to, subtracted from, multiplied, and
changed. We had Gramm-Rudman-Hollings intervening and adding a
number of barnacles or enhancements, depending upon your
view.
As the budget process ran the show, many of the normal actors
were shunted aside. That is to say, the authorizing committees
thought that their power was being usurped by the budget
committees' process. The appropriators certainly thought that
their unique powers were being thwarted or constrained, which of
course in both cases was part of the idea but, nonetheless, not
an idea that they were comfortable with.
As a result of that, I would suggest, there were other
processes that the Congress used to pursue with vigor that were
diminished. A prime example is oversight. The authorizing
committees in the past, in addition to the appropriation
committees, mainly were charged with oversight. They would call
up cabinet secretaries or administrators and ask them pointed
questions about the programs they were running and how they were
doing it.
That happens almost not at all anymore. In part, I would
suggest, it is because of how the budget process discouraged the
authorizing committees. But that is one of the ancillary effects
of how the budget process evolved. Along the way, the budget
process made a lot of enemies. It made enemies of the
authorizers, the appropriators, and sometimes the leadership.
Meanwhile, the original proponents went away. Too many of them
retired and died, and those few who were left to support the
process were worn down.
So we get to the modern-day history and why I think that it is
easy to say the process is dead. As most of you are aware, this
was the first year since 1975 that the Senate has not passed a
budget resolution. There have been other occasions when we did
not have a conference report, when we did not have agreement
between the Houses, but never a time when the Senate did not pass
a resolution.
We have very few enforcement tools left, among the more modern
mechanisms at least: pay-as-you-go and discretionary caps on
appropriations. Those were the result of the 1997 budget
agreement, and they expired at the end of September last year.
The Senate has extended them until April, as I recall, for a few
months, but they are not likely, at least at the moment, to be
very effective. So we had no budget plan this year, and we have
no enforcement mechanisms.
You can see the result of that situation, I would suggest, at
least in part, in the failure to pass appropriation bills.
Certainly, it reflects a difference in policy. Yes, it is a
political argument. Yes, the question is how many votes you have
on the House or Senate floor. But without at least the cover, the
backdrop, the support from a budget resolution and a budget
agreed to by the Congress, it is very difficult to forward any
particular appropriation bill contrary to what the President
wants, which leads me to the largest implication, I think, of
where we find ourselves today. And that is that much of the
budgetary power that was implemented in part by the Congress in
the wake of Nixon impoundment and the utilization of this budget
process, much of that power has evolved back to the President.
Now, the President's budget is the only game in town. Now, the
President's veto is the only power in town when it comes to
budgetary decisions. So the Congress has given up, I think, a
large measure of what it had grabbed back from President Nixon.
That, coupled with the fact that there is very little oversight
going on in the authorizing committees, I think, makes it very
easy for the President to economically and actually impose his
will on the Congress in these matters.
Now, what would one do about that? I am not sure. There are
probably ways to resurrect the current process. We were
discussing this yesterday at CBO, and someone likened the process
to a zombie. And someone else said well, maybe, just an organ
transplant patient. Given the, shall we say, sarcastic wits that
survive at CBO, the debate quickly became whether the organ in
need was a brain or a heart. Then there was some discussion about
the viability of reviving the patient. That is not clear. Your
guess is probably as good or better than mine. I know that the
incoming chairman of the Budget Committee of the Senate, Senator
Nickles, says that he wants to try to resurrect the process. He
is talking about having reconciliation; he is talking about
budget resolutions--things that we used to have. However, I think
that he is going to have a tough time. I think it will be a
number of years before the Congress again asserts itself in a
systematic way and reasserts its own power in the budget process
over that of the President.
To what end is not clear. How soon, how fast, and how easy
that will be are also not clear. But I think what is clear is
that without this kind of process (something that forces the
Congress to agree on some broad outlines on what it wants to do
for a spending plan), without its arguments and its votes against
a President, the Congress is going to be dominated by any
President--until the Congress learns again how to grab back some
of that budgetary power.
This is not new. In some ways, the history of the budget
process, to the extent that we have had one, goes well beyond
1972 or 1975, when I started. The process, of course, goes back
to the beginnings of the Congress with the constitutional
requirement that the Congress initiate spending and revenue
bills, but there has certainly been more back-and-forth between
the executive branch and the Congress in this last century than
in the first. Nonetheless, the Presidential power for budgeting
has waxed and waned. One might say that the power belonged
exclusively to the Congress in the early days. It was the only
entity that actually had bills and added them up. Then, in the
early 1900s, it may have unfortunately required the executive
branch to develop an executive budget and send it to the Hill.
After that, budgetary power tended to evolve toward the executive
branch. So this situation is not new. For the Congress, the power
has waxed and waned in some ways, particularly in the last
century. But I do think that with the current budgetary climate
and particularly with the impending retirement of my generation,
it is truly an unfortunate time for the Congress to be without
the ability to fashion a budget.
I say that because, as many of you have heard me say before,
the outlook for the near term, that is, the next 20 or 30 years,
is not particularly appealing if you are one of my kids. The
programs for the elderly will go from currently spending about 7
percent of GDP (gross domestic product) to somewhere in the
neighborhood of 16 percent or 17 percent of GDP. That is about,
as most of you know, what we spend on all federal programs
now.
We have collected, on average, 18 percent of GDP in federal
revenue since World War II. So, under current law, we will be
spending most of that--at least--on programs for the elderly,
which will take us to the largest peacetime fiscal shift in
history. We will either have to dramatically raise taxes, cut
spending on these programs, cut spending on other programs, or
borrow from our kids. It is not clear that we can borrow that
much for very long. If we were to borrow something like 10
percent of GDP, which in today's terms would be roughly a
trillion dollars a year--that is probably not sustainable for
very long.
So we are coming to a large change in fiscal policy, as I
said, the largest peacetime change this country has ever seen.
And to have a Congress without the tools to respond both to the
executive branch and to develop its own plans and its own
policies is not a situation that we would say is ideal. And,
frankly, I do not think we have much time to facilitate the
fiscal future and the economy for our children. As I said, my
generation begins to retire in earnest in 2010, and by 2030, the
number of folks in Medicare and Social Security will have doubled
from 39 million to roughly 80 million. Meanwhile, we will have
added very few workers.
So we have to accommodate this future somehow. That is very
clear. What is not clear is how the Congress will respond and how
it can respond without a more wholesome, complete budget process.
With that, I think I will quit and entertain questions to find
out what is on your mind.
|
|