Key Dates in Hijackers'
Tracking
abcnews.com/ap
September 21
The U.S. government learned of two of the future Sept. 11 hijackers in early
2000, but missed several opportunities to track them and prevent their entry
into the United States. Had they been put on watch lists before late August
2001, they probably would have been denied entry into the country. Whether
their arrests would have led to the uncovering of the Sept. 11 plot is open to
speculation.
On Friday, the congressional investigation into the attacks released details
of the actions by the CIA, FBI and others about the two hijackers. Here's a
timeline of relevant events surrounding the two hijackers, according to the
congressional report and other sources"
December 1999: U.S. intelligence learns about an upcoming meeting of
suspected al-Qaida members in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, when it intercepts
telephone conversations. The phone number was provided to the United States by
a suspect in the previous year's bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa.
The CIA alerts Malaysian authorities to watch the meeting. The CIA learns the
name of one attendee: Khalid al-Mihdhar, a future
hijacker.
Dec. 14: Ahmed Ressam, while entering the country from Canada, is arrested
by a sharp-eyed U.S. Customs agent in Washington state. Ressam, who is later
associated with al-Qaida, had a car with a trunk full of explosives that he may
have intended to detonate at Los Angeles International Airport at the height of
the millennium holiday travel period.
Jan. 5, 2000: The CIA informs FBI agents about the meeting and of
al-Mihdhar, according to CIA officials.
Jan. 5-8: Al-Mihdhar and future hijacker
Nawaf al-Hazmi, both Saudis, meet with a Yemeni named
Tawfiq Attash Khallad and others in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysian authorities acquire
photographs of the attendees, but not audio. The subject of the meeting still
is not known.
Jan. 15: Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi fly from Bangkok, Thailand, to Los Angeles. They are not
tracked.
March: The CIA learns al-Hazmi's identity and that
he traveled to Los Angeles. At some later point before Sept. 11, U.S.
authorities learn the identity of al-Hazmi's brother
and future hijacker Salem al-Hazmi, but little else about him. They also later
discover that al-Mihdhar was on the same flight as
Nawaf al-Hazmi.
Spring: Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi are living openly in San Diego and are taking flight
lessons.
June 10: Al-Mihdhar flies from Los Angeles to
Frankfurt, Germany.
July 7: Al-Hazmi applies to extend his visa.
Oct. 12: Suicide bombers with ties to al-Qaida attack the destroyer USS Cole
in Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors.
December 2000: Al-Hazmi moves to Mesa, Ariz., to
live with American Airlines Flight 77 hijacker Hani
Hanjour.
Jan. 4, 2001: U.S. authorities identify Khallad as one of the masterminds of
the USS Cole bombing. He is now considered a senior al-Qaida leader who remains
at large. Around this time, U.S. officials also receive information suggesting
he was at the Malaysia meeting.
May: To assist in the Cole investigation, the CIA supplies the FBI with
photographs from the Malaysia meeting including one of al-Mihdhar.
June 11: FBI and CIA officials meet in New York in connection with the Cole
investigation and the Malaysia meeting. There is some dispute over what
happened at the meeting, but FBI agents said they sought intelligence
information that the CIA officers declined to supply. CIA officials say they
kept the FBI informed about their discoveries.
June 13: Al-Mihdhar obtains another U.S. visa in
Saudi Arabia and claims he has never been to the United States before.
July 4: Al-Mihdhar re-enters the United States.
July 13: A CIA officer assigned to the FBI researches Khallad's presence at
the Malaysia meeting. He sends an e-mail to the CIA's Counterterrorism Center,
"This is a major league killer, who orchestrated the Cole attack and possibly
the embassy bombings."
Aug. 21: Analysts at the Counterterrorism Center piece together some of
al-Mihdhar's and al-Hazmi's
movements, and raise concerns that they were in Los Angeles about the time
Ressam may have intended to attack LAX.
Aug. 23: The CIA asks the State Department, INS, Customs Service and FBI
requesting al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi and two others from the Malaysia meeting be placed on
watch lists and denied access to the United States. They are placed on relevant
watch lists the next day.
The CIA knew al-Mihdhar was in the United States
but he now could be detained if he attempts to leave. The State Department
begins the process to revoke their visas. The FBI begins looking for them.
Aug. 29: A New York-based FBI agent asks headquarters to allow his office to
use its "full criminal investigative resources" to find al-Mihdhar. But headquarters denies the request because
al-Mihdhar was not under criminal investigation. The
frustrated agent replies: "Someday someone will die and wall or not the public
will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource
we had at certain `problems'."
Sept. 11: American Airlines 77, with hijackers al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi, Hanjour, Salem al-Hazmi and Majed Moqed on board, crashes into
the Pentagon, killing 189 people.
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