Military Postpones Iraq
Invasion--Bush Defeat
Washington Post
The uniformed leaders of the U.S. military believe they have
persuaded the Pentagon's civilian leadership to put off an
invasion of Iraq until next year at the earliest and perhaps not
to do it at all, according to senior Pentagon officials.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have waged a determined
behind-the-scenes campaign to persuade the Bush administration to
reconsider an aggressive posture toward Iraq in which war was
regarded as all but inevitable. This included a secret briefing
at the White House earlier this month for President Bush by Army
Gen. Tommy R. Franks, who as head of the Central Command would
oversee any U.S. military campaign against Iraq.
During the meeting, Franks told the president that invading
Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein would require at least 200,000
troops, far more than some other military experts have
calculated. This was in line with views of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who have repeatedly emphasized the lengthy buildup that
would be required, concerns about Hussein's possible use of
biological and chemical weapons and the possible casualties,
officials said.
The Bush administration still appears dedicated to the goal of
removing the Iraqi leader from power, but partly in response to
the military's advice, it is focusing more on undermining him
through covert intelligence operations, two officials added.
"There are many ways in which that [regime change] could come
about, only one of which is a military campaign in Iraq," one
official familiar with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's
thinking said yesterday.
Any final decision would be the president's. Appearing in
Berlin yesterday, Bush offered more tough rhetoric about Iraq and
other countries he has labeled part of an "axis of evil." But at
a news conference in Berlin, he also said that he had told German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder: "I have no war plans on my desk,
which is the truth, and that we've got to use all means at our
disposal to deal with Saddam Hussein."
In addition to skepticism from within his own military, Bush
faces concern in Europe about the wisdom of expanding the war to
Iraq. Schroeder embraced the effort to pressure Hussein to accept
weapons inspectors but would not be drawn into discussion of a
military attack.
The debate inside the Pentagon is only part of a larger
discussion of Iraq that also involves the White House, the State
Department and the CIA, among others. Those deliberations go well
beyond discussing the merits of mounting a military operation and
lately have focused on the role of international diplomacy and
what use to make of unwieldy Iraqi opposition groups abroad.
The disclosure of the efforts by the uniformed leadership to
slow the drive toward war suggests that a military confrontation
with Iraq may be further away than has been suggested by many
administration officials. Some of the chiefs' concerns were first
reported in yesterday's editions of USA Today.
However, the situation is still fluid, and Pentagon insiders
say intense pressure is being brought by advocates of military
action within the administration to get the chiefs on their
side.
In a series of meetings this spring, the six members of the
Joint Chiefs -- the chairman, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers;
the vice chairman, Marine Gen. Peter Pace; and the chiefs of the
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps -- hammered out a position
that emphasizes the difficulties of any Iraq campaign while also
quietly questioning the wisdom of a military confrontation with
Hussein.
"I think all the chiefs stood shoulder-to-shoulder on this,"
said one officer tracking the debate, which has been intense at
times. In one of the most emphatic summaries of the direction of
the debate, one top general said the "Iraq hysteria" he detected
last winter in some senior Bush administration officials has been
diffused.
But others familiar with the discussions held by the Joint
Chiefs in the secure Pentagon facility known as "the Tank" say
that it is premature for the uniformed military to declare
victory. They note that Rumsfeld has so far mostly stayed out of
the debate, leaving that to Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy defense
secretary, and Douglas J. Feith, the Pentagon's top policy
official, who are seen inside the Pentagon as the Defense
Department's leading hawks on Iraq.
In their Tank sessions, the chiefs focused on two specific
concerns about the conduct of any offensive. One was that
Hussein, if faced with losing power and likely being killed,
would no longer feel the constraints that during the Persian Gulf
War apparently kept him from using his stores of chemical and
biological weapons. The other was the danger of becoming bogged
down in bloody block-by-block urban warfare in Baghdad that could
kill thousands of U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians.
Franks, who attended a Tank session before seeing the
president, has expressed similar concerns, said one officer.
"Tommy's issue is, a lot of things have to be in place, and these
things are not all military things," he recounted.
In addition to those tactical concerns, some of the chiefs
also expressed misgivings about the wisdom of dislodging an
aging, weakened Hussein who, by some accounts, has behaved better
than usual in recent months. Their worry is that there is no
evidence that there is a clear successor who is any better, and
that there are significant risks that Iraq may wind up with a
more hostile, activist regime.
As the discussions of Iraq policy were culminating earlier
this month, Franks briefed the Joint Chiefs and then the
president on the outline of the plan he would use if ordered to
attack. His plan, which was the only one presented, called for a
substantial combat force that was close to half the 541,000
troops deployed for the 1991 Gulf War, which the military refers
to as Operation Desert Storm. Some at the Pentagon promptly
labeled the Franks plan Desert Storm Lite.
When asked at a news conference in Tampa earlier this week
about what military force be needed to invade Iraq, Franks
answered, "That's a great question and one for which I don't have
an answer because my boss has not yet asked me to put together a
plan to do that."
Franks's narrow response relied on the U.S. military
definition of "plan" as a detailed, step-by-step blueprint for
military operations. What Franks discussed with the Joint Chiefs
and the president was a simpler outline for an attack that the
military terms a "concept of operations."
By emphasizing the large force that he believes would be
needed, Franks's briefings also seemed to rule out an alternate
plan that some civilians in the Bush administration had
advocated. Dubbed "the Downing plan," for retired Army Gen. Wayne
A. Downing, who suggested it four years ago, this approach calls
for conquering Iraq with combination of airstrikes and Special
Operations attacks in coordination with indigenous fighters.
That option, which would have required a fraction of the U.S.
troops Franks indicated he would need, was not presented as a
briefing either to the Joint Chiefs or to the president,
officials said. Downing serves as the White House's coordinator
for counterterrorism efforts.
This spring, "the civilian leadership thought they could do
this à la Afghanistan, with Special Forces," said a senior
officer. "I think they've been dissuaded of that."
The point of the Franks briefings, this general said, was
that, "We don't need as much as Desert Storm, but we need a large
competent ground force, in order to shape the other force. What
forces the other guy to mass is the presence of another ground
force. Then you can deal with that force with fires and air
power." In this view, those who say the model of the Afghan war
can be transferred to Iraq fail to take into account that the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan had thousands of troops ready to
fight, some of them heavily armed, whereas there is no equivalent
indigenous force in Iraq.
Despite the confidence expressed by some officers that an
attack on Iraq has been postponed and may never occur, some on
the other side of the argument warn that it is far from
concluded. There are other top officers in the U.S. military who
disagree with the chiefs' assessment. Their worries, said one
general, "smack to me of risk aversion." He added: "The fact is
they [the Iraqi armed forces] are one-third the size they used to
be. Their air force isn't there."
Advocates of an Iraqi invasion note that Bush has not backed
away from his tough State of the Union rhetoric. "They [the
military leaders] have been able to defer it, so they've won this
round of the bureaucratic battle," said one Republican foreign
policy expert who is hawkish on Iraq. But, he continued, "I don't
believe you're going to see the president sit back and say,
'Sure, containment's the way to go, keeping him in the box is
working.' "
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