Bush Ignored CIA Caveats on
Iraq
Washington Post
Saturday, February 7, 2004; Page
A17
On the web Sunday, February 08,
2004
In its fall 2002 campaign to win congressional support for a
war against Iraq, President Bush and his top advisers ignored
many of the caveats and qualifiers included in the classified
report on Saddam Hussein's weapons that CIA Director George J.
Tenet defended Thursday.
In fact, they made some of their most unequivocal assertions
about unconventional weapons before the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was completed.
Iraq "is a grave and gathering danger," Bush told the United
Nations on Sept. 12, 2002. At the White House two weeks later --
after referring to a British government report that Iraq could
launch "a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45
minutes after the order" is given -- he went on to say, "Each
passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives
anthrax or VX -- nerve gas -- or someday a nuclear weapon to a
terrorist ally."
Three weeks later, on the day the NIE was delivered to
Congress, Bush told lawmakers in the White House Rose Garden that
Iraq's current course was "a threat of unique urgency."
On Thursday, summarizing the NIE's conclusions, Tenet said:
"They never said Iraq was an imminent threat."
The administration's prewar comments -- and the more cautious,
qualified phrasings of intelligence analysts -- are at the heart
of the debate over whether the faulty prewar claims resulted from
bad intelligence or exaggeration by top White House officials --
or both.
Former chief U.S. weapons inspector David Kay told senators
last week that caveats often fall by the wayside "the higher you
go up" the bureaucratic chain. At the top, he said, "you read the
headlines, you read the summary, you're busy, you've got other
things to do."
Administration supporters say Bush, Vice President Cheney and
others were simply extrapolating from the comprehensive
intelligence provided by Tenet's intelligence community. Critics
say Bush and his Cabinet had already decided to go to war,
regardless of what the intelligence efforts found.
The controversy, arising during the Democratic presidential
primary campaign, has taken on a partisan hue. Some Democrats,
however, say they perceived GOP partisanship earlier, when
Republicans advocated an invasion of Iraq before the 2002
congressional elections. Bush said on Sept.13, 2002, that he did
not think he could explain to voters the position of some
Democrats who said Congress should wait for the United Nations to
authorize the use of force before giving the president the
authority he wanted.
Now that extended efforts to find weapons of mass destruction
have proved futile, some are asking why Bush, Cheney and Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld used unequivocal rhetoric to
describe the threat from Iraq when the intelligence on the
subject was much more nuanced and subjective.
For example, when Bush on Sept. 24, 2002, repeated the British
claim that Iraq's chemical weapons could be activated within 45
minutes, he ignored the fact that U.S. intelligence mistrusted
the source and that the claim never appeared in the October 2002
U.S. estimate.
On Aug. 26, 2002, Cheney said: "Many of us are convinced that
Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon." The estimate,
several weeks later, would say it would take as many as five
years, unless Baghdad immediately obtained weapons-grade
materials.
In the same speech, Cheney raised the specter that Hussein
would give chemical or biological weapons to terrorists, a
prospect invoked often in the weeks to come. "Deliverable weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a
murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitute as
grave a threat as can be imagined," Cheney said.
It would be more than a month later that a declassified
portion of the NIE would show that U.S. intelligence analysts had
forecast that Hussein would give such weapons to terrorists only
if Iraq were invaded and he faced annihilation.
"The probability of him initiating an attack . . . in the
foreseeable future . . . I think would be low," a senior CIA
official told the Senate intelligence committee during a
classified briefing on the estimate on Oct. 2, 2002. The CIA
released a partial transcript five days later after committee
Democrats complained that a published "white paper" on Iraq's
weapons had not given the public a fair reading of what the
classified NIE contained.
On Sept. 8, 2002, Cheney said of Hussein on NBC's "Meet the
Press": "We do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using
his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order
to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon." Cheney was
referring to the aluminum tubes that some analysts believed could
be used for a centrifuge to help make nuclear materials; others
believed they were for an antiaircraft rocket.
Such absolute certainty, however, did not appear in the
estimate. Tenet said Thursday that the controversy has yet to be
cleared up.
On Sept. 19, 2002, Rumsfeld, speaking before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, said: "No terrorist state poses a greater or
more immediate threat to the security of our people than the
regime of Saddam Hussein and Iraq." The October estimate
contained no similar language.
Speaking to the House Armed Services Committee on Sept. 18,
2002, Rumsfeld described an immediate threat from biological
weapons. Hussein, he said, could deploy "sleeper cells armed with
biological weapons to attack us from within -- and then deny any
knowledge or connection to the attacks."
While the intelligence community believed Hussein had
biological agents such as anthrax, and that they could be quickly
produced and weaponized for delivery by bombs, missiles or aerial
sprayers, the October 2002 estimate said: "We had no specific
information on the types or quantities of weapons, agents, or
stockpiles at Baghdad's disposal."
Tenet's "provisional bottom line" on biological weapons, he
said Thursday, is that research and development efforts were
underway in Iraq "that would have permitted a rapid shift to
agent production if seed stocks were available. But we do not
know if production took place -- and just as clearly -- we have
not yet found biological weapons."
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