How politics of terror pushed a nation to
the edge
New Zealand Herald
By RUPERT CORNWELL
August 04, 2004
To describe America's latest terror alert as a silly season
folly, filling the airwaves and newspaper pages in the usual high
summer absence of real news, would be uncharitable.
But, in the space of 48 hours, what sounded on Sunday like an
imminent threat to financial targets in New York, New Jersey and
Washington has metamorphosed into an imbroglio of disarray and
confusion, with a dash of farce thrown in.
On Sunday afternoon, when the government announced it had
gained remarkably specific intelligence from captured al Qaeda
operatives, breathless news media accounts indicated the worst
might be at hand. The next day, the evidence discovered on
captured al Qaeda computer disks in Pakistan was revealed to be
three or four years old, pre-dating the 11 September attacks
themselves.
By yesterday, the controversy was starting to provoke
questions that recalled the great Iraqi WMD debacle. Had the
intelligence analysts got it wrong, was the Bush administration
again over-reacting, and was the White House using a national
security scare to further its election year political goals?
At least the origins of this summer drama are reasonably
clear. They may be traced to 13 June, and the arrest in Karachi
of an al Qaeda member named Musaad Aruchi. That led to the
capture exactly a month later of Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, a
Pakistani national and relatively low-level al Qaeda operative, a
computer expert specialising in communications.
Finally, on 25 July, came the arrest in the Pakistani city of
Gujrat of Ahmad Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian and a top member of
Osama bin Laden's organisation, who is believed to have had
helped the 1998 bombings of US embassies in east Africa. The new
material seized with him was passed to US intelligence.
On 29 July - hours before John Kerry was to speak at the
Democratic convention in Boston - the CIA discussed the find at a
meeting with FBI and military officials. The indications were
that al Qaeda was targeting the New York Stock Exchange in
Manhattan, the Prudential financial group headquarters in Newark,
New Jersey, and the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund buildings in central Washington.
Tom Ridge, the head of Homeland Security, decided on Saturday
to raise the colour coded terror alert for the three districts
from yellow, or "elevated", to orange or "high", and go public
with the news. On Sunday morning, President George Bush gave his
assent.
The news dropped like a bombshell into the torpor of an
early-August weekend. The attack was likely to be "in the near
term", and there was evidence that terrorists had recently
conducted a dry run for the attack on the Prudential.
The information was "alarming in both its amount and its
specificity", Mr Ridge declared; an unnamed "senior intelligence
official" told The New York Times that it was "chilling in its
scope, detail and breadth".
For President Bush, it was further proof that: "We are a
nation in danger."
Within a day, the backpedalling had begun. The material was
old, some of it culled long ago from the internet. Nor was there
evidence that al Qaeda had checked the Prudential building in
recent weeks.
Instead, other targets - including the BankAmerica building in
San Francisco - had also been under consideration by the
terrorists, although they did not feature in the
announcement.
However, the discoveries in Pakistan dovetailed with warnings
that the terrorist group was planning to strike this autumn. In
short, all is confusion. But the confusion offers an insight into
the politics of terror in the US, and public attitudes to the
terrorist threat.
Three factors are at play. One is purely political, the second
has to do with the natures of bureaucracies everywhere, and the
third reflects what may be described as the American national
character.
In political terms, terrorism ranks only third among the
issues on voters' minds, behind Iraq and the economy. Far more
importantly, however, is that terrorism was and is likely to
remain Mr Bush's best issue. Polls put him 10 points or more
ahead of Mr Kerry on the issue.
The Massachusetts Senator avoids any suggestion that Mr Bush
may be playing politics with the issue, even though the terrorist
threat seems to acquire a new urgency whenever the Democrats are
in the limelight.
Indeed, Mr Kerry's criticism of the President is the opposite:
that the White House is not reacting strongly enough. The second
contributor for the drama is the age-old instinct of those in
authority to protect their rear ends.
Constant unfounded warnings run the risk of crying wolf, so
that the accurate warning, if it comes, will be greeted by public
indifference. On the other hand, imagine the consequences if
officials ignored indications of a terrorist strike only for it
to take place.
No, there was "no evidence of recent surveillance", of the
target sites, Mr Ridge said yesterday.
"But this [al Qaeda] is an organisation that plans in advance.
We don't do politics in the Department of Homeland Security."
In fact, even homeland security is politics too. The
assumption is that, in the immediate aftermath of an attack,
Americans would rally around Mr Bush. But soon afterwards the
awkward questions would start: How had the terrorists again
slipped through the country's supposedly reinforced defences and
was the Iraq war a mistake, at best a distraction from, at worst
a stimulus to, the "war on terror?"
The post-attack "bounce" for the President might be
shortlived. All these assumptions depend on the third factor in
the equation - the US public and its feelings about the terrorist
menace.
The 11 September attacks were a shattering,
attitude-transforming event. Europeans have learnt to live with
terror. Americans have not.
It is hard to believe that had a British government issued a
similar warning and then admitted the information on which it was
based was three or four years old, it would not have been
pilloried for scaremongering.
Not so here. This is a country that yearns for certainty and
predictability. Americans like to rank and categorise everything.
Hence the mania for lists, and hence the habit of weather
forecasts of talking not of the mere likelihood of rain, but of
measuring that likelihood in percentage terms.
The fact is that post-11 September protection of the homeland
has been effective. The installation of new barricades, street
closures and security checkpoints in New York, Newark and
Washington, and sundry other disruptions has been accepted with
little complaint.
"Better safe than sorry" is the Bush administration's
watchword, and most Americans seem to agree. The threat alert,
for mysterious reasons, may soon be moved down to yellow. But the
barricades and the rest will stay in place.
As Mr Bush knows full well, if the public thinks he is
lowering the guard on terror, he could find himself out of a job
come 3 November.
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