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Joint Congressional Inquiry
into 9/11
FindLaw.com
July 24, 2003
Joint Congressional Inquiry
PART ONE-FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 – BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
A. Factual Findings
1. Finding: While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great
deal of valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his
terrorist activities, none of it identified the time, place, and
specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September
11, 2001. Nonetheless, the Community did have information that
was clearly relevant to the September 11 attacks, particularly
when considered for its collective significance.
2. Finding: During the spring and summer of 2001, the
Intelligence Community experienced a significant increase in
information indicating that Bin Ladin and al- Qa'ida
intended to strike against U.S. interests in the very near
future.
3. Finding: Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer
of 2001, the Intelligence Community received a modest, but
relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that
indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United
States. Nonetheless, testimony and interviews confirm that it was
the general view of the Intelligence Community, in the spring and
summer of 2001, that the threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most
likely occur against U.S. interests overseas, despite indications
of plans and intentions to attack in the domestic United
States.
4. Finding: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer
of 2001, the Intelligence Community received information
indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among other means
of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This information did
not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of,
or collective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of
threat.
*National Security Advisor
Condoleeza Rice stated in a May 16, 2002 press briefing that, on
August 6, 2001, the President's Daily Brief (PDB) included
information about Bin Ladin's methods of operation from a
historical perspective dating back to 1997. One of the methods
was that Bin Ladin might choose to highjack an airliner in order
to hold passengers hostage to gain release of one of their
operatives. She stated, however, that the report did not contain
specific warning information, but only a generalized warning, and
did not contain information that al-Qa'ida was discussing a
particular planned attack against a specific target at any
specific time, place, or by any specific method.
5. Finding: Although relevant information that is significant
in retrospect regarding the attacks was available to the
Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 2001, the Community
too often failed to focus on that information and consider and
appreciate its collective significance in terms of a probable
terrorist attack. Neither did the Intelligence Community
demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips with the new
transnational threats. Some significant pieces of information in
the vast stream of data being collected were overlooked, some
were not recognized as potentially significant at the time and
therefore not disseminated, and some required additional action
on the part of foreign governments before a direct connection to
the hijackers could have been established. For all those reasons,
the Intelligence Community failed to capitalize fully on
available, and potentially important, information. The
sub-findings below identify each category of this
information.
5.a. [During 1999, the National
Security Agency obtained a number of communications – none
of which included specific detail regarding the time, place or
nature of the September 11 attacks -- connecting individuals to
terrorism who were identified, after September 11, 2001, as
participants in the attacks that occurred on that day].
5.b. The Intelligence Community
acquired additional, and highly significant, information
regarding Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi in early 2000.
Critical parts of the information concerning al-Mihdhar and
al-Hazmi lay dormant within the Intelligence Community for as
long as eighteen months, at the very time when plans for the
September 11 attacks were proceeding. The CIA missed repeated
opportunities to act based on the information in its possession
that these two Bin Ladin-associated terrorists were traveling to
the United States, and to add their names to watchlists.
5.c. [In January 2000, after the
meeting of al-Qa'ida operatives in Malaysia, Khalid
al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi entered the United States [ ].
Thereafter, the Intelligence Community obtained information
indicating that an individual named "Khaled' at an
unknown location had contacted a suspected terrorist facility in
the Middle East. The Intelligence Community reported some of this
information, but did not report all of it. Some of it was not
reported because it was deemed not terrorist-related. It was not
until after September 11, 2001 that the Intelligence Community
determined that these contacts had been made from future hijacker
Khalid al-Mihdhar while he was living within the domestic United
States].
5.d. [This Joint Inquiry confirmed
that these same two future hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf
al-Hazmi, had numerous contacts with a long time FBI
counterterrorism informant in California and that a third future
hijacker, Hani Hanjour, apparently had more limited contact with
the same informant. In mid- to late-2000, the CIA already had
information indicating that al-Mihdhar had a multiple entry U.S.
visa and that al-Hazmi had in fact traveled to Los Angeles, but
the two had not been watchlisted and information suggesting that
two suspected terrorists could well be in the United States had
not yet been given to the FBI. The San Diego FBI field office,
which handled the informant in question, did not receive that
information or any of the other intelligence information
pertaining to al- Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, prior to September 11,
2001. As a result, the FBI missed the opportunity to task a
uniquely well-positioned informant -- who denies having any
advance knowledge of the plot --- to collect information about
the hijackers and their plans within the United States.]
5.e. On July 10, 2001, an FBI Phoenix
field office agent sent an "Electronic Communication'
to four individuals in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) and
two individuals in the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) at FBI
Headquarters, and to two agents on International Terrorism squads
in the FBI New York field office. In the communication, the agent
expressed his concerns, based on his first-hand knowledge, that
there was a coordinated effort underway by Bin Ladin to send
students to the United States for civil aviation-related
training. He noted that there was an "inordinate number of
individuals of investigative interest' in this type of
training in Arizona and expressed his suspicion that this was an
effort to establish a cadre of individuals in civil aviation who
would conduct future terrorist activity. The Phoenix
agent's communication requested that FBI Headquarters
consider implementing four recommendations: accumulate a
list of civil aviation universities/colleges around the country;
establish liaison with these schools; discuss the
theories contained in the Phoenix EC with the Intelligence
Community; and consider seeking authority to obtain visa
information concerning individuals seeking to attend flight
schools. However, the FBI Headquarters personnel did not take the
action requested by the Phoenix field office agent prior to
September 11, 2001. The Phoenix communication generated little or
no interest at either FBI Headquarters or the FBI's New
York field office.
5.f. In August 2001, the FBI's
Minneapolis field office, in conjunction with the INS, detained
Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national who had enrolled in flight
training in Minnesota. FBI agents there also suspected that
Moussaoui was involved in a hijacking plot. FBI Headquarters
attorneys determined that there was not probable cause to obtain
a court order to search Moussaoui's belongings under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, personnel
at FBI Headquarters, including the Radical Fundamentalist Unit
and the National Security Law Unit, as well as agents in the
Minneapolis field office, misunderstood the legal standard for
obtaining an order under FISA. As a result, FBI Minneapolis field
office personnel wasted valuable investigative resources trying
to connect the Chechen rebels to al-Qa'ida. Finally, no one
at the FBI apparently connected the Moussaoui investigation with
the heightened threat environment [page 24] in the summer of
2001, the Phoenix communication, or the entry of al-Mihdhar and
al-Hazmi into the United States.
5.g. The Joint Inquiry confirmed that
at least some of the hijackers were not as isolated during their
time in the United States as has been previously suggested.
Rather, they maintained a number of contacts both in the United
[page 28] States and abroad during this time period. Some of
those contacts were with individuals who were known to the FBI,
through either past or, at the time, ongoing FBI inquiries and
investigations. Although it is not known to what extent any of
these contacts in the United States were aware of the plot, it is
now clear that they did provide at least some of the hijackers
with substantial assistance while they were living in this
country.
5.h. [Since 1995, the CIA had been
aware of a radical Islamic presence in Germany, including
individuals with connections to Usama Bin Ladin. Prior to
September 11, 2001, the CIA had unsuccessfully sought additional
information on individuals who have now been identified as
associates of some of the hijackers].
5.i. Prior to September 11, the
Intelligence Community had information linking Khalid Shaykh
Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the Intelligence Community as
the mastermind of the attacks, to Bin Ladin, to terrorist plans
to use aircraft as weapons, and to terrorist activity in the
United States. The Intelligence Community, however, relegated KSM
to rendition target status following his 1996 indictment in
connection with the Bojinka Plot and, as a result, focused
primarily on his location, rather than his activities and place
in the al-Qa'ida hierarchy. The Community also did not
recognize the significance of reporting in June 2001 concerning
KSM's active role in sending terrorists to the United
States, or the facilitation of their activities upon arriving in
the United States. Collection efforts were not targeted on
information about KSM that might have helped better understand
al-Qa'ida's plans and intentions, and KSM's
role in the September 11 attacks was a surprise to the
Intelligence Community.
5.j. [In the period from September 8
to September 10, 2001 NSA intercepted, but did not translate or
disseminate until after September 11, some communications that
indicated possible impending terrorist activity].
B. CONCLUSION – FACTUAL FINDINGS
In short, for a variety of reasons, the Intelligence Community
failed to capitalize on both the individual and collective
significance of available information that appears relevant to
the events of September 11. As a result, the Community missed
opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot by denying entry
to or detaining would-be hijackers; to at least try to unravel
the plot through surveillance and other investigative work within
the United States; [page 35] and, finally, to generate a
heightened state of alert and thus harden the homeland against
attack. No one will ever know what might have happened had more
connections been drawn between these disparate pieces of
information. We will never definitively know to what extent the
Community would have been able and willing to exploit fully all
the opportunities that may have emerged. The important point is
that the Intelligence Community, for a variety of reasons, did
not bring together and fully appreciate a range of information
that could have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and
preventing Usama Bin Ladin's plan to attack the United
States on September 11, 2001.
C. SYSTEMIC FINDINGS
1. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community
was neither well organized nor equipped, and did not adequately
adapt, to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused
on targets within the domestic United States. Serious gaps
existed between the collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign
and U.S. domestic intelligence capabilities. The U.S. foreign
intelligence agencies paid inadequate attention to the potential
for a domestic attack. The CIA's failure to watchlist
suspected terrorists aggressively reflected a lack of emphasis on
a process designed to protect the homeland from the terrorist
threat. As a result, CIA employees failed to watchlist al-Mihdhar
and al-Hazmi. At home, the counterterrorism effort suffered from
the lack of an effective domestic intelligence capability. The
FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of
activity by al-Qa'ida and other international terrorist
groups operating in the United States. Taken together, these
problems greatly exacerbated the nation's vulnerability to
an increasingly dangerous and immediate international terrorist
threat inside the United States.
2. Finding: Prior to September 11, 2001, neither the U.S.
Government as a whole nor the Intelligence Community had a
comprehensive counterterrorist strategy for combating the threat
posed by Usama Bin Ladin. Furthermore, the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling or unable to marshal the
full range of Intelligence Community resources necessary to
combat the growing threat to the United States.
3. Finding: Between the end of the Cold War and September 11,
2001, overall Intelligence Community funding fell or remained
even in constant dollars, while funding for the Community's
counterterrorism efforts increased considerably. Despite those
increases, the accumulation of intelligence priorities, a
burdensome requirements process, the overall decline in
Intelligence Community funding, and reliance on supplemental
appropriations made it difficult to allocate Community resources
effectively against an evolving terrorist threat. Inefficiencies
in the resource and requirements process were compounded by
problems in Intelligence Community budgeting practices and
procedures.
4. Finding: While technology remains one of this
nation's greatest advantages, it has not been fully and
most effectively applied in support of U.S. counterterrorism
efforts. Persistent problems in this area included a lack of
collaboration between Intelligence Community agencies, a
reluctance to develop and implement new technical capabilities
aggressively, the FBI's reliance on outdated and
insufficient technical systems, and the absence of a central
counterterrorism database.
5. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence
Community's understanding of al-Qa'ida was hampered
by insufficient analytic focus and quality, particularly in terms
of strategic analysis. Analysis and analysts were not always used
effectively because of the perception in some quarters of the
Intelligence Community that they were less important to agency
counterterrorism missions than were operations personnel. The
quality of counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many
analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and
without access to critical information. As a result, there was a
dearth of creative, aggressive analysis targeting Bin Ladin and a
persistent inability to comprehend the collective significance of
individual pieces of intelligence. These analytic deficiencies
seriously undercut the ability of U.S. policymakers to understand
the full nature of the threat, and to make fully informed
decisions.
6. Finding: Prior to September 11, The Intelligence Community
was not prepared to handle the challenge it faced in translating
the volumes of foreign language counterterrorism intelligence it
collected. Agencies within the Intelligence Community experienced
backlogs in material awaiting translation, a shortage of language
specialists and language-qualified field officers, and a
readiness level of only 30% in the most critical
terrorism-related languages.
7. Finding: [Prior to September 11, the Intelligence
Community's ability to produce significant and timely
signals intelligence on counterterrorism was limited by
NSA's failure to address modern communications technology
aggressively, continuing conflict between Intelligence Community
agencies, NSA's cautious approach to any collection of
intelligence relating to activities in the United States, and
insufficient collaboration between NSA and the FBI regarding the
potential for terrorist attacks within the United States].
8. Finding: The continuing erosion of NSA's program
management expertise and experience has hindered its contribution
to the fight against terrorism. NSA continues to have mixed
results in providing timely technical solutions to modern
intelligence collection, analysis, and information sharing
problems.
9. Finding: The U.S. Government does not presently bring
together in one place all terrorism-related information from all
sources. While CTC does manage overseas operations and has access
to most Intelligence Community information, it does not collect
terrorism-related information from all sources, domestic and
foreign. Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not
adequately share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to
September 11. This breakdown in communications was the result of
a number of factors, including differences in the agencies'
missions, legal authorities and cultures. Information was not
sufficiently shared, not only between different Intelligence
Community agencies, but also within individual agencies, and
between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies.
10. Finding: Serious problems in information sharing also
persisted, prior to September 11, between the Intelligence
Community and relevant non-Intelligence Community agencies. This
included other federal agencies as well as state and local
authorities. This lack of communication and collaboration
deprived those other entities, as well as the Intelligence
Community, of access to potentially valuable information in the
"war' against Bin Ladin. The Inquiry's focus on
the Intelligence Community limited the extent to which it
explored these issues, and this is an area that should be
reviewed further.
11. Finding: Prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence
Community did not effectively develop and use human sources to
penetrate the al-Qa'ida inner circle. This lack of reliable
and knowledgeable human sources significantly limited the
Community's ability to acquire intelligence that could be
acted upon before the September 11 attacks. In part, at least,
the lack of unilateral (i.e., U.S. –recruited)
counterterrorism sources was a product of an excessive reliance
on foreign liaison services.
12.
Finding: During the summer of 2001, when the Intelligence
Community was bracing for an imminent al-Qa'ida attack,
difficulties with FBI applications for Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance and the FISA process led to
a diminished level of coverage of suspected al-Qa'ida
operatives in the United States. The effect of these difficulties
was compounded by the perception that spread among FBI personnel
at Headquarters and the field offices that the FISA process was
lengthy and fraught with peril.
13. Finding: {redacted})
14. Finding: [Senior U.S. military officials were reluctant to
use U.S. military assets to conduct offensive counterterrorism
efforts in Afghanistan, or to support or participate in CIA
operations directed against al-Qa'ida prior to September
11. At least part of this reluctance was driven by the
military's view that the Intelligence Community was unable
to provide the intelligence needed to support military
operations. Although the U.S. military did participate in [ ]
counterterrorism efforts to counter Usama Bin Ladin's
terrorist network prior to September 11, 2001, most of the
military's focus was on force protection].
15. Finding: The Intelligence Community depended heavily on
foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the
collection of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of
other counterterrorism activities. The results were mixed in
terms of productive intelligence, reflecting vast differences in
the ability and willingness of the various foreign services to
target the Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida network. Intelligence
Community agencies sometimes failed to coordinate their
relationships with foreign services adequately, either within the
Intelligence Community or with broader U.S. Government liaison
and foreign policy efforts. This reliance on foreign liaison
services also resulted in a lack of focus on the development of
unilateral human sources.
16. Finding: [The activities of the September 11 hijackers in
the United States appear to have been financed, in large part,
from monies sent to them from abroad and also brought in on their
persons. Prior to September 11, there was no coordinated U.S.
Government-wide strategy to track terrorist funding and close
down their financial support networks. There was also a
reluctance in some parts of the U.S. Government to track
terrorist funding and close down their financial support
networks. As a result, the U.S. Government was unable to disrupt
financial support for Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist
activities effectively].
D. RELATED FINDINGS
17. Finding: Despite intelligence reporting from 1998 through
the summer of 2001 indicating that Usama Bin Ladin's
terrorist network intended to strike inside the United States,
the United States Government did not undertake a comprehensive
effort to implement defensive measures in the United States.
18. Finding: Between 1996 and September 2001, the
counterterrorism strategy adopted by the U. S. Government did not
succeed in eliminating Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training
ground for Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist network. A range of
instruments was used to counter al-Qa'ida, with law
enforcement often emerging as a leading tool because other means
were deemed not to be feasible or failed to produce results.
Although numerous successful prosecutions were generated, law
enforcement efforts were not adequate by themselves to target or
eliminate Bin Ladin's sanctuary. While the United States
persisted in observing the rule of law and accepted norms of
international behavior, Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida recognized
no rules and thrived in the safehaven provided by
Afghanistan.
19. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community
and the U.S. Government labored to prevent attacks by Usama Bin
Ladin and his terrorist network against the United States, but
largely without the benefit of an alert, mobilized and committed
American public. Despite intelligence information on the
immediacy of the threat level in the spring and summer of 2001,
the assumption prevailed in the U.S. Government that attacks of
the magnitude of September 11 could not happen here. As a result,
there was insufficient effort to alert the American public to the
reality and gravity of the threat.
20. Finding: Located in Part Four Entitled "Finding,
Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National
Security Matters.'
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