Iraq War Theories
The Sacramento Bee
Behind Iraq prewar debate
David Westphal
November 27, 2005
WASHINGTON - For months leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, it
was Iraq's supposed stockpile of threatening weapons that President Bush held
up as the main rationale for military action.
But it wasn't the only rationale expressed by the White House. In fact, some
experts believe other factors rarely talked about might have been at play in
Bush's war decision, as well.
The issue of why Bush chose war is once again frontand- center, with war
critics suggesting the administration may have exaggerated prewar claims of an
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction arsenal, and Bush defenders branding the
detractors as historical revisionists.
Even as they scrap over the weapons issue, both sides suggest other factors
may have been in the mix.
Former President Jimmy Carter, for example, contends that Bush's lieutenants
came to office hoping for an opportunity to establish an American foothold in
the Middle East, and saw the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks as an opportunity.
Others suggest that Bush was looking for a demonstration project to show
American strength and resolve in the aftermath of the attacks.
Richard Clarke, the former White House national security expert who has been
critical of Bush's war decision, said the rationales for invasion varied from
person to person.
Bush's own reason, Clarke believes, was a visceral response to Sept. 11. "A
'Don't Mess With Texas' thing," he said.
Paul Wolfowitz, the former No. 2 official at the Pentagon, encouraged the
notion that justifications other than weapons of mass destruction were
influential in the war decision. Soon after it became clear that dangerous
weapons would not be found, Wolfowitz told Vanity Fair magazine that "for
reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy, we settled
on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass
destruction as the core reason."
In fact, he said, other factors were important, including terrorism and
Saddam Hussein's human rights abuses. Wolfowitz also noted that, as a result of
Saddam's overthrow, the United States had been able to achieve a long-sought
goal of pulling its troops out of Saudi Arabia.
James Phillips, a security expert at the Heritage Foundation, says these
additional concerns couldn't have been sufficient to warrant war. "It took the
9/11 attack," he said, "combined with Saddam's refusal to abide by United
Nations sanctions."
At the same time, Phillips acknowledged that, behind the scenes, other
factors weighed in the motivation for attacking Iraq. Here's a look at four of
them:
A military foothold in the heart of the Mideast
Carter argues that, even before the September 2001 terrorist attacks, key
members of Bush's administration wanted to march to Baghdad to establish an
American beachhead.
"They had decided to go to war against Iraq before George Bush was elected,"
the former president told reporters on his recent book tour.
Indeed, two months before the 2000 election, a prominent neoconservative
think thank, Project for the New American Century, issued a report that made
the case for a bigger military presence in the Middle East.
"The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in
Gulf regional security," the report said. "While the unresolved conflict with
Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American
force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam
Hussein."
It's unclear to what extent Bush and his advisers saw long-term prospects
for maintaining troops in Iraq. But Jay Garner, the first U.S. administrator in
Iraq, told the National Journal in 2003 that Iraq would play the same "coaling
station" role performed by the Philippines for the U.S. Navy during most of the
20th century.
"That's what Iraq is for the next few decades," he said, "our coaling
station that gives us great presence in the Middle East."
The idea of having an American military footprint in Iraq has plenty of
tangents. In his book, "Against All Enemies," Clarke said some administration
officials sought it because it would strengthen Israel's military position;
others feared a growing risk to American oil imports.
Whether U.S. officials remain hopeful of a long-term Iraq presence for
American troops isn't clear. Officially, the White House says the troops will
come home when the Iraqi military is strong enough to maintain stability.
Ensuring access to Middle Eastern oil
Of all the theories the White House wanted to discredit as the war approached,
this was the biggest. Bush and his top advisers vehemently denied that the
attack was a grab for the vast oil resources in Iraq.
"That issue is not in play," then- White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said
in 2002.
But with the United States utterly reliant on Middle East oil for its
economic survival, and Iraq holding the second-highest reserves in the world
(Saudi Arabia has the largest), there was plenty of talk about whether the
United States needed to take action to secure its oil access.
The issue has never completely gone away.
Wolfowitz told Congress shortly after the war's outbreak that Iraq oil
reserves could pay for much of the country's postwar reconstruction - an
assertion that brought quick condemnation from around the world.
Bush, meanwhile, now cites Iraqi oil as a reason for keeping American troops
stationed there, warning that extremists would confiscate oil resources if U.S.
troops left too soon. "They'd seize oil fields to fund their ambitions," he
said.
A demonstration of American resolve
Former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill says he was stunned to find that senior
White House officials, immediately upon taking office, were itching for a fight
with Iraq, and that one of the most aggressive was the president.
"It was all about finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The
president saying 'Go find me a way to do this,'" said O'Neill in his book, "The
Price of Loyalty."
The idea that the United States needed to make a military statement in the
Middle East to counteract a reputation for ducking a military fight had been
brewing for a while in some foreign policy circles.
Clarke and other experts cite a long list of provocations against the United
States that have evoked weak responses by U.S. presidents: Carter's handling of
the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979-80, Ronald Reagan's decision to leave
Lebanon after the suicide bombing that killed more than 200 Marines in 1983,
the elder Bush's lack of retaliation for the Libyan bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 in 1988 and Bill Clinton's quick exit from Somalia in 1993.
Iraq, in this scenario, would become an ideal demonstration project of
American resolve and military might.
The debate over this proposition rages on. Bush argues that a hasty
departure by U.S. troops would signal weakness to Islamic terrorist groups.
Others contend that the war itself has weakened the American cause throughout
the Middle East by deepening anti- U.S. sentiment.
Making a region ripe for democracy
How do you encourage democracy in a region where you're dependent on an
unsavory band of dictators to tamp down volatile electorates and ensure the
flow of oil? American presidents have struggled with this dilemma for decades,
with little to show for it.
The Sept. 11 attacks provided an opening, in the minds of some: Remove
arguably the worst dictator in Saddam Hussein and a democratic revolution may
begin to form in the Middle East. Bush made this theme the centerpiece of his
second inaugural address in January.
"The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the
world," he said. Manyforeign policy experts are openly skeptical that democracy
can take hold in the Middle East, and in recent months their ranks have grown
to include some conservative commentators.
"The lesson from Iraq is clear: The United States' staying power is waning,
and the commitment to setting in place the fundamental building blocks of
democracy is weak," Danielle Pletka, a scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute, said in a recent commentary.
Others say the series of national votes in Iraq is the harbinger of a
democracy that has the best chance in years of changing the Middle East status
quo - albeit slowly.
"Instant democracy does not work in totalitarian states," wrote Middle East
expert Patrick Clawson in the Israeli daily Haaretz. "The Bush team is
encouraged by the small changes in Egypt and the Gulf monarchies, as well as
the unexpected progress in freeing Lebanon."
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