Bush lied about Iraqi
Aluminum Tubes *
Washington Post
An impeachable Offense
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, January 24, 2003; Page A01
When President Bush
traveled to the United Nations in September to make his case
against Iraq, he brought along a rare piece of evidence for what
he called Iraq's "continued appetite" for nuclear bombs. The
finding: Iraq had tried to buy thousands of high-strength
aluminum tubes, which Bush said were "used to enrich uranium for
a nuclear weapon."
Bush cited the aluminum tubes in his speech before the U.N.
General Assembly and in documents presented to U.N. leaders. Vice
President Cheney and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice
both repeated the claim, with Rice describing the tubes as "only
really suited for nuclear weapons programs."
It was by far the most prominent, detailed assertion by the
White House of recent Iraqi efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.
But according to government officials and weapons experts, the
claim now appears to be seriously in doubt.
After weeks of investigation, U.N. weapons
inspectors in Iraq are increasingly confident that the aluminum
tubes were never meant for enriching uranium, according to
officials familiar with the inspection process. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N.-chartered nuclear watchdog,
reported in a Jan. 8 preliminary assessment that the tubes were
"not directly suitable" for uranium enrichment but were
"consistent" with making ordinary artillery rockets -- a finding
that meshed with Iraq's official explanation for the tubes. New
evidence supporting that conclusion has been gathered in recent
weeks and will be presented to the U.N. Security Council in a
report due to be released on Monday, the officials said.
Moreover, there were clues from the beginning that should have
raised doubts about claims that the tubes were part of a secret
Iraqi nuclear weapons program, according to U.S. and
international experts on uranium enrichment. The quantity and
specifications of the tubes -- narrow, silver cylinders measuring
81 millimeters in diameter and about a meter in length -- made
them ill-suited to enrich uranium without extensive modification,
the experts said.
But they are a perfect fit for a well-documented 81mm
conventional rocket program in place for two decades. Iraq
imported the same aluminum tubes for rockets in the 1980s. The
new tubes it tried to purchase actually bear an inscription that
includes the word "rocket," according to one official who
examined them.
"It may be technically possible that the tubes could be used
to enrich uranium," said one expert familiar with the
investigation of Iraq's attempted acquisition. "But you'd have to
believe that Iraq deliberately ordered the wrong stock and
intended to spend a great deal of time and money reworking each
piece."
As the U.N. inspections continue, some weapons
experts said the aluminum tubes saga could undermine the
credibility of claims about Iraq's arsenal. To date, the Bush
administration has declined to release photos or other specific
evidence to bolster its contention that Iraq is actively seeking
to acquire new biological, chemical and nuclear arms, and the
means to deliver them.
The U.N. inspections earlier this month turned up 16 empty
chemical warheads for short-range, 122mm rockets. ,But inspectors said that so far they have found no
conclusive proof of a new Iraqi effort to acquire weapons of mass
destruction in searches of facilities that had been
identified as suspicious in U.S. and British intelligence
reports. U.N. officials contend that Iraq retains biological and
chemical weapons and components it acquired before the 1991
Persian Gulf War.
"If the U.S. government puts out bad information it runs a
risk of undermining the good information it possesses," said
David Albright, a former IAEA weapons inspector who has
investigated Iraq's past nuclear programs extensively.
"In this case, I fear that the information was
put out there for a short-term political goal: to convince people
that Saddam Hussein is close to acquiring nuclear
weapons."
The Bush administration, while acknowledging the IAEA's
findings on the aluminum tubes, has not retreated from its
earlier statements. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer reacted
to the IAEA's initial report on Jan. 8 by asserting that the case
was still open.
"It should be noted," Fleischer said, "that the attempted
acquisition of such tubes is prohibited under the United Nations
resolutions in any case." U.N. sanctions restrict Iraq's ability
to import "dual-use" items that potentially could be used for
weapons.
U.S. intelligence officials contend that the evidence, on
balance, still points to a secret uranium enrichment program,
although there is significant disagreement within the
intelligence services. Those supporting the nuclear theory said
they were influenced by "other intelligence" beyond the
specifications of the tubes themselves, according to one
intelligence official. He did not elaborate.
IAEA officials said the investigation of the tubes officially
remains open. Earlier this week, Iraq agreed to provide
inspectors with additional data about its intended use for the
tubes.
The controversy stems from a series of Iraqi attempts to
purchase large quantities -- thousands or tens of thousands -- of
high-strength aluminum tubes over the last two years. Apparently
none of the attempts succeeded, although in one instance in 2001
a shipment of more than 60,000 Chinese-made aluminum tubes made
it as far as Jordan before it was intercepted, according to
officials familiar with Iraq's procurement attempts.
Since then, the officials said, Iraq has made at least two
other attempts to acquire the tubes. The more recent attempts
involved private firms located in what was described only as a
"NATO country." In all, more than 120,000 of the tubes were
reportedly sought.
In each of the attempts, Iraq requested tubes made of an
aluminum alloy with precise dimensions and high tolerances for
heat and stress. To intelligence analysts, the requests had a
ring of familiarity: Iraq had imported aluminum tubes in the
1980s, although with different specifications and much larger
diameter, to build gas centrifuges -- fast-spinning machines used
in enriching uranium for nuclear weapons. Through a crash nuclear
program launched in 1990, Iraq succeeded in enriching nearly
enough uranium for one bomb before its plans were disrupted in
1991 by the start of the Gulf War, according to U.N. weapons
inspectors.
By several accounts, Iraq's recent attempts to buy aluminum
tubes sparked a rancorous debate as Bush administration
officials, intelligence analysts and government scientists argued
over Iraq's intent.
"A number of people argued that the tubes could not possibly
be used as artillery rockets because the specifications were so
precise. It would be a waste of dollars," said one knowledgeable
scientist.
Ultimately, the conclusion in the intelligence discussion was
that Iraq was planning to use the tubes in a nuclear program.
This view was favored by CIA analysts. However, there were
dissenting arguments by enrichment experts at the Energy
Department and officials at the State Department. What ultimately
swung the argument in favor of the nuclear theory was the
observation that Iraq had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes
with such precise specifications that it made other uses seem
unlikely, officials said.
By contrast, in Britain, the government of Prime Minister Tony
Blair said in a Sept. 24 white paper that there was "no
definitive intelligence" that the tubes were destined for a
nuclear program.
The tubes were made of an aluminum-zinc alloy known as
7000-series, which is used in a wide range of industrial
applications. But the dimensions and technical features, such as
metal thickness and surface coatings, made them an unlikely
choice for centrifuges, several nuclear experts said. Iraq used a
different aluminum alloy in its centrifuges in the 1980s before
switching to more advanced metals known as maraging steel and
carbon fibers, which are better suited for the task, the experts
said.
Significantly, there is no evidence so far that
Iraq sought other materials required for centrifuges, such as
motors, metal caps and special magnets, U.S. and international
officials said.
Bush's remarks about the aluminum tubes caused a stir at the
IAEA's headquarters in Vienna. Weapons experts at the agency had
also been monitoring Iraq's attempts to buy the aluminum but were
skeptical of arguments that the tubes had a nuclear purpose,
according to one official who spoke on the condition of
anonymity. The IAEA spent seven years in the 1990s documenting
and ultimately destroying all known vestiges of Iraq's nuclear
weapons program, including its gas centrifuges.
After returning to Iraq when weapons inspections resumed in
November, the IAEA made it a priority to sort out the conflicting
claims, according to officials familiar with the probe. In
December, the agency spent several days poring through files and
interviewing people involved in the attempted acquisition of the
tubes -- including officials at the company that supplied the
metal and managers of the Baghdad importing firm that apparently
had been set up as a front company to acquire special parts and
materials for Iraq's Ministry of Industry. According to informed
officials, the IAEA concluded Iraq had indeed been running a
secret procurement operation, but the intended beneficiary was
not Iraq's Atomic Energy Commission; rather, it was an
established army program to replace Iraq's aging arsenal of
conventional 81mm rockets, the type used in multiple rocket
launchers.
The explanation made sense for several reasons, they said. In
the 1980s, Iraq was known to have obtained a design for 81mm
rockets through reverse-engineering of munitions it had
previously purchased abroad. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqis
built tens of thousands of such rockets, using high-strength,
7000-series aluminum tubes it bought from foreign suppliers. U.N.
inspectors in the 1990s had allowed Iraq to retain a stockpile of
about 160,000 of the 81mm rockets, and an inspection of the
stockpile last month confirmed that the rockets still exist,
though now corroded after years of exposure in outdoor
depots.
By all appearances, the Iraqis were "trying to buy exact
replacements for those rockets," said Albright, the former IAEA
inspector.
Albright, now president of the Institute for Science and
International Security, a Washington research group, said that
even a less sinister explanation for the aluminum tubes did not
suggest Iraq is entirely innocent.
"But if Iraq does have a centrifuge program, it is
well-hidden, and it is important for us to come up with
information that will help us find it," Albright said. "This
incident discredits that effort at a time when we can least
afford it."
Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this
report.
© 2003 The Washington Post Company
Photo/courtesy International Atomic Energy Agency
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